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          In late October 1950, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) committed approximately 
260,000 troops to combat in North Korea.   The initial Chinese decision to intervene in the 
Korean conflict was based on a misperception of American commitment to halt communist 
expansion.  American actions seemed to communicate the desire to avoid confrontation.  The 
withdrawal of U.S. troops and the limited equipping and training of the South Korean army 
implied Washingtons lack of interest in the fate of Korea.  Therefore, Mao endorsed North 
Koreas proposal for the military reunification of Korea.  China stood to gain international 
prestige and access to Soviet equipment and training at little cost. But the North Korean attack 
collapsed following the commitment of American and United Nations forces. 
          Chinese troops attacked and surprised the UN forces, inflicting heavy losses while driving 
them down the peninsula in disarray.  Mao desired the quick expulsion of UN forces from Korea.  
To this end, the Chinese launched five brutal offensives between October 1950 and April 1951, 
but failed to realize their goal of imposing a communist government on an unified Korea.   
          Following the commencement of hostilities, the Chinese exaggerated their own military 
capabilities and underestimated the firepower and general effectiveness of American forces.  But 
the Chinese army was unable to assimilate modern weaponry and tactics and, facing immense 
logistical difficulties, could not use its superior numbers to overwhelm United Nations forces.  
Inaccurate political and military assessments by Chinese leaders served to deny the PRC its goal 









On the night of October 19, 1950, the first of approximately 260,000 soldiers belonging 
to the Chinese Peoples Volunteer Forces (CPVF) began their historic trek from northeastern 
China down into the Korean Peninsula.1  Their objective, ostensibly, was to confront the United 
States and bring an end to American imperialist aggression against their North Korean brothers.  
In reality, they marched to bolster the rapidly collapsing North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA), 
which had failed in its bid to reunify Korea forcibly under a communist government.  The 
Chinese expected to achieve a decisive victory over the American Paper Tiger" and its 
Running Dog allies. In what would become a bloody war of attrition, the dogged determination 
of the United Nations Command (UNC) forces would not only dispel any Chinese hopes of a 
rapid victory, but would inflict over 539,000 casualties on the CPVF.2 
 The origins of the Chinese decision to intervene in the Korean War are rooted in 
misinterpretation, miscommunication and inaccurate assessments of both friendly and enemy 
military forces.  China correctly identified the United States failure to realize Koreas 
geographically strategic importance.  However, Mao failed to note Americas growing 
commitment to contain the spread of communism and the impact this commitment would have 
on any Communist-sponsored aggression.  The United States had clearly demonstrated that 
commitment in its active efforts to suppress Communist activities in Greece and, more recently, 
in the Philippines.  A special study (NSC-68) by the National Security Council in 1950 laid out 
in writing, the United States official policy of all-out containment.  
     The confusion of the Chinese Civil War and the United States decisive measures to 
deny formal diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China precluded effective 
                                                
1 Xiaobing Li, Allan R. Millett and Bin Yu, Maos Generals Remember, pp. 5, 62. 




communication between the two nations.  The inability of both United States and Chinese 
foreign policy officials to understand each others thought processes led to further 
miscommunication. In essence, each nation viewed the others statements and actions through its 
own ethno-centric filters.  As a result, both nations grossly underestimated not only the intentions 
and capabilities of their opponent, but also their level of determination to succeed in their 
endeavors. 
           Neither China nor the United States confined its mutual incomprehension to the area of 
politics.  This fault also manifested itself in assessments of their respective military forces. China 
exaggerated the capabilities of the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF), whose soldiers constituted 
the CPVF.  At the same time, Beijing greatly underestimated the determination, mobility and 
firepower of the United Nations Command forces and failed to take note of the increasingly 
important role of air power on the modern battlefield.  Although the CPVF was extremely 
successful in identifying and exploiting many of its opponents weaknesses, Chinese errors in 
adapting to modern technology proved to be critical. The UNCs high mobility and increased 
firepower, which the Chinese trivialized, played a pivotal role in prolonging the conflict and 
denying the CPVF and the NKPA their ultimate victory. 
 The United States also fell prey to the error of inaccurate assessment.  Insufficient 
regional intelligence assets combined with a lack of expertise in interpreting intelligence data to 
ensure that the United States picture of ongoing events in Korea would remain distorted.  
Throughout the conflict, the United States retained an unshaken belief in its national level 
intelligence agencies and their abilities to anticipate enemy actions, despite the failure of those 




the American intelligence network to gauge enemy strength and intentions accurately ensured 
that UN forces would be taken by surprise not once, but twice! 
 An inaccurate assessment of Chinese military capabilities compounded the error.  The 
United States based its assessments on its military advisory teams observations of Chinese 
Nationalist forces during World War II and the Chinese Civil War.  Closer examination of these 
reports would have revealed that, while contact with Chinese Communist forces during the 
period of observation had been limited, it had resulted in an elevated opinion of Communist 
force capabilities compared to those of the Nationalist forces.  George F. Kennan perhaps best 
expressed American opinion at the time of the Chinese forces in general when he said that in 
any war of the foreseeable future China could at best be a weak ally or at worse an 
inconsequential enemy.3 
 The inability of China and the United States to identify and correct such deficiencies was 
directly responsible for their confrontation in Korea in 1950.  Failure to communicate strategic 
intent in a clear fashion resulted from both Chinese and American misinterpretation of each 
others regional actions.  Likewise, failure to grasp correctly the potential of their opponents 
military forces led both sides to exaggerate their own military capabilities. These combined 








                                                
3 George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1950-1963, p. 47. 
 
CHAPTER 1 
A POLITICAL HISTORY OF KOREA (1945-1950) 
 
 
 Koreas historical geographic importance directly influenced its post-World War II fate, 
ensuring that it would become a point of contention between the Western and the Communist 
powers.  Its strategic location, for the two major Communist states, led almost inevitably to 
Soviet and Chinese support of North Korean offensive action against the Republic of Korea.  The 
United States indecisiveness in establishing and conducting foreign policy in the Far East would 
prove to be the other critical factor in creating the conditions for war in Korea. 
           Koreas regional strategic importance lay primarily in its significance as a historical path 




began a bitter struggle for dominance in Manchuria and both nations considered control of Korea 
to be vital.  Aggressive competition led to armed conflict in April 1904.  By August 1905, 
Czarist Russia had proven to be the weaker nation as it suffered military defeat at the hands of 
Japan and fell prey to internal domestic upheaval. The Russian Communist Partys seizure of 
power in 1917 did nothing to alter the status quo.  The Japanese succeeded in achieving a state of 
regional military dominance.  By 1945, however, the imminent collapse of their empire signaled 
a change.   
The Soviets, in compliance with the Potsdam Treaty, declared war on Japan on August 8, 
1945.  This action presented the Allies with the problem of delineating post-war demarcation 
lines for the occupying Soviet and American troops.  The U.S. Armys War Department 
Operations and Plans Division proposed the 38th parallel as a dividing line in Korea and the 
Soviets readily accepted.  Following the Japanese surrender on August 14, Soviet troops 
immediately moved to the parallel and sealed the border.  In September, U.S. forces secured 
Korea south of the 38th parallel. 
           The United States and the Soviet Union conducted negotiations for the establishment of a 
united Korea from 1945 to 1948, but differing national agendas ensured that the talks were in 
vain.  In 1948 the United Nations adopted an American proposal to hold free elections to decide 
the fate of Korea.  Though the North, tutored by Moscow, declined to participate, the South went 
ahead with the elections and chose Syngman Rhee as the first president of the Republic of Korea.  
The North immediately responded by establishing the Peoples Democratic Republic of Korea 
under Kim Il Sung. 
The same UN proposal also called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea.  Both 
the Soviet Union and the United States complied with the letter of the proposal, if not with the 
spirit, and withdrew the majority of their forces.  However, foreign troops remained in both  
6 
zones of occupation in the form of advisory groups.  While Soviet advisors concentrated on 
building and training the fledgling North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA), the 500-man United 
States Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) devoted its efforts to developing a South 
Korean police force to maintain internal security.  According to John Muccio, American 
Ambassador to Korea from 1949 to 1952, "very little was done in training and organizing [the] 
military; an army or navy.4 
Both North and South Korea found the concept of a divided nation unacceptable and 
refused to recognize the border at the 38th parallel.  Each claimed to be the legitimate 
government of Korea and advocated forced reunification.  To that end, the NKPA received new 
equipment and developed its capabilities under Soviet tutelage.  The Republic of Korea Army 
(ROKA), however, remained a force in name only.  As early as 1947, Washington had been 
looking for a way to get out of Korea.5 As such, it was in the best interest of the United States 
to ensure that the ROKA remained incapable of conducting offensive combat operations.  A 
ROKA without teeth would be incapable of initiating a war with the North, allowing the U.S to 
withdraw its forces peacefully.  Harry S. Truman, U.S. President during the Korean War, stated 
in his memoirs that his decision in favor of an American withdrawal from South Korea was 
based, in part, on his desire to avoid U.S. entanglement in political arguments between the ROK 
and the DPRK.6  Recognizing the growing disparity in military force capabilities, Kim Il Sung 
sounded the Soviet Union and the newly established Peoples Republic of China about the 
possibility of support for an invasion of South Korea.   
Soviet regional interests in Asia centered on border security.  The recent creation of the 
Peoples Republic of China (PRC) should have dispelled Stalins concerns but this was not the  
                                                
4 Richard D. McKinzie, oral interview of John J. Muccio, 7 December 1973, document located at   
   http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/muccio3.htm. 
5 Richard D. McKinzie, oral interview of Niles W. Bond, 28 December 1973, document located at  
   http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/bond.htm. 
6 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, p. 329. 
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case.  Mao Zedong had risen to power in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the expense of 
the pro-Soviet faction.  In Moscows eyes, therefore, his loyalty to communism was suspect.  
Additionally, while Soviet communism was based on the belief that the urban proletariat would 
initiate revolution, Maos interpretation of communism was based on a revolution led by the 
peasant population. Maos break from Soviet doctrine was based, logically, on the fact that 
China was an agricultural nation.  Chinese logic, however, did nothing to alleviate Moscows 
wariness.7  Foreign Minister Zhou Enlais declaration on October 1, 1949 that Beijing was ready 
to establish diplomatic relations with any and all governments8 deepened Stalins misgivings.   
Stalin was aware that the United States desired to create a split between the Soviet Union 
and China, as evidenced by U.S. Secretary of State Dean Achesons claim that the Soviets were 
out to subjugate China.9  The chances seemed slender that the PRC would emulate Yugoslavia 
and become a Communist state independent of the Soviet Union, but Stalins continued refusal 
to meet with Mao10 had done nothing to establish a mutual bond between the two nations. 
President Harry S. Trumans announcement on January 5, 1950 that the United States would no 
longer provide aid to Taiwan11 seemed to suggest that Washington would acquiesce in a 
Communist takeover of the Nationalist stronghold.  This seemed to pose a further threat to Soviet 
far-east security by creating the opportunity for the United States and the PRC to reach a 
diplomatic accommodation.  In order to forestall this event, and the concomitant threat of an 
independent China, The Soviet Union would have to direct its efforts towards securing some  
 
                                                
7 Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners; Stalin, Mao and the Korean War,  
   pp. 25-28. 
8 Quoted in Richard C. Thornton, Odd Man Out; Truman, Stalin, Mao, and the Origins of the Korean War,    
   p. 17. 
9 Memorandum of conversation between V.M. Molotov , A.Y. Vyshinsky and Mao Zedong, 17 January 1950, by V.  
   M. Molotov, in Odd Arne Westad, Fighting for Friendship: Mao, Stalin and the Sino  Soviet Treaty of 1950, 
   pp.  232-234. 
10 Ibid., p. 224.  See also Thornton, Odd Man Out, p. 28 and Patrick C. Roe, The Dragon Strikes, p. 48. 
11 Thornton, Odd Man Out, pp. 52, 60-62. 
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kind of cooperative understanding with Beijing.  Such an agreement would demonstrate to the 
world that the China stood solidly in the Communist camp.   
In light of these considerations, Korea began to assume a position of increasing 
importance in Soviet strategic concerns.  A joint Soviet-Chinese venture in support of the 
proposed North Korean invasion of South Korea would strengthen their diplomatic bonds.  The 
USSR could further enhance the mutual spirit of brotherhood by providing equipment and 
training to the CCF.  The disastrous Chinese assaults on the Nationalist held islands of Matsu 
and Quemoy had clearly demonstrated the CCFs need for such assistance.12  Providing aid to 
Beijing would also establish its dependency on the USSR and give Stalin a stronger hand in 
negotiating a continued Soviet presence in Chinese territories. 
The involvement of Chinese forces in Korea would also ensure that Beijing was too 
preoccupied to continue offensive action against Taiwan and reduce the possibility of American 
armed intervention on behalf of the Nationalists.  Careful redirection of Maos attention away 
from Taiwan would eliminate the likelihood of a general war between China and the America 
and reduce the possibility that the USSR could be drawn into a direct confrontation with the U.S.  
Stalins assumptions on this point proved highly accurate.  Following the outbreak of hostilities 
in Korea, the Chinese would first postpone, and then cancel, their planned assault on Taiwan.13   
However, American intervention on behalf of the Republic of Korea remained a 
possibility.  As early as December 1949, Stalin recognized that, but he dismissed the idea.  The 
Americans are afraid of war, he said simply.14  American intervention would serve only to 
hinder the establishment of friendly diplomatic relations between the United States and the PRC 
while it would reinforce the Chinese position in the Communist camp.  Stalin further expressed  
                                                
12 Roe, The Dragon Strikes, p. 50.  See also Thornton, Odd Man Out, pp. 114-115. 
13 Chen Jian, The Sino-Soviet Alliance and Chinas Entry into the Korean War, p. 26.  See also Roe, The  
    Dragon Strikes, p. 50. 
14 Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 18 December 1949, in Chen Jian, Comparing Russian and Chinese   
     Sources: A New Point of Departure for Cold War History, p. 20.  
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the belief that, should the Soviet Union and the United States become involved in a 
confrontation, it would be better to face the Americans now, when China and the USSR were 
stronger militarily than the United States and Great Britain.15 Stalin thus came to consider North 
Korean offensive action against the Republic of Korea a win-win situation for the Soviet 
Union.  Chinese sentiments were not too different, though for other reasons.  
Just as Stalin was suspicious of Maos intentions, so, too, was Mao suspicious of the 
Soviet Communist Party.  Apparent Soviet designs on Chinese territory were chief among Maos 
concerns.  The USSR maintained garrisons in Sinkiang and Manchuria under its 1945 treaty with 
the Nationalist Chinese.  Stalin had even gone so far as to make Outer Mongolia a Soviet satellite 
state in 1924, a fact the treaty had ratified.16    Mao clearly understood the intensity of Stalins 
desire to maintain a Soviet presence in China. This was particularly true with regard to the port 
of Dalian and the Manchurian Railroad.  Mao demonstrated his understanding by broaching the 
subject as the opening topic in his treaty negotiations with Stalin.17 
 Stalin had created further tension with his blunt statement to a group of Chinese visitors 
in 1946 that the Communist movement in China had no future and that the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) should dissolve its army and join the Nationalist Guomindang (GMD).  Further 
insult was added by the Soviet maintenance of diplomatic relations with the Chinese Nationalist 
government until shortly before the end of the civil war.  Increasing Soviet appreciation of the 
CCP and its abilities did not come until 1947, when CCF operations had the Nationalist forces 
withdrawing in all regions.18 
 
                                                
15 Stalin to Kim Il Sung, 8 October 1950, in Alexandre Y. Mansourov, in Stalin, Mao, Kim, and Chinas Decision  
    to Enter the Korean War September 16-October 15, 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives,  
    pp. 101, 116. 
16 Goncharov, Uncertain Partners, pp. 2-5.  See also Thornton, Odd Man Out, pp. 25-26. 
17 Record of conversation between Stalin and Mao, 16 December 1949, in Stalins Conversations with Chinese  
    Leaders, p. 5. 
18 Roe, The Dragon Strikes, pp. 47-48 and Goncharov, Uncertain Partners, p. 23. 
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 Yet, Mao understood that the USSR would be his benefactor in Asia and he believed that 
the United States was not interested in an independent China.  The awarding of the German 
concession to Japan in 1919, at Washingtons instigation, seemed to have demonstrated the 
Americans intent to maintain Western dominance in China.  The fact remained that the Soviet 
Union was a Communist state.  As such, and despite differences, the USSR would be the most 
reliable ally Mao was likely to find. 
 Other factors affected Chinese opinions concerning Korea.  For one thing, there was its 
geographical importance as a historical gateway for the invasion of Manchuria.  Between 1868 
and 1945, Japan had launched ten invasions of China, the majority of them through the Korean 
peninsula.  Japanese attempts to conquer Manchuria had been responsible for the deaths of 35 
million Chinese and an economic loss of approximately $500 billion (in 1937 Chinese 
currency).19  Manchuria was the traditional center of Chinas heavy metals industry and 
possessed large deposits of coal, limestone and iron-ore, all of which are required for the 
production of steel.  So long as western imperialist powers had access to the Korean peninsula, 
the threat to Manchuria and China remained. 
 Mao also recognized the possibility that action against the Republic of Korea could result 
in a confrontation with the United States; however, he agreed with Stalin that the threat was 
negligible.20  It would seem that Chinese officials were more focused on political opportunities 
than on possible risks.  The Communists had just secured a major victory by forcing the 
Nationalist forces from the mainland and in the flush of victory PRC strategists paid little heed 
to risks.   
           Maos commitment to action against the democratic South would allow the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) to unite the Chinese people by feeding on their long-held resentment of  
                                                
19 Xiaobing Li, Maos Generals Remember, p. 28. 
20 Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 18 December 1949, Chen Jian, Comparing Russian and Chinese Sources,  
    p. 20.  
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the Western powers historical exploitation of China.  Additionally, such enthusiastic support by 
the general population would give the CCP a free hand to eliminate Chinese dissidents.  Should 
the United States choose to intervene, China would gain the opportunity to demonstrate that it 
would no longer tolerate foreign meddling in Asian affairs and that it was not afraid to act to 
further the Communist revolutionary movement.21  Mao seems to have believed that a 
confrontation with the United States in Asia was inevitable.  As such, Korea offered the most 
favorable terms, both politically and militarily, for the Chinese to engage the Americans.  
 American policy in Asia played a pivotal role in establishing conditions for the outbreak 
of hostilities in Korea.  American actions and public statements often seemed inconsistent with 
official policy.  The result was Washingtons failure to convey accurately its intentions to either 
the USSR or the PRC.  American foreign policy in the Far East contributed to the outbreak of 
war by unwittingly communicating a desire to avoid confrontation with the Communists.  To 
Mao and Stalin this translated directly into a lack of commitment to preserving the current 
balance of power in Asia. 
 Above all, the United States desired to avoid military entanglement in Korea. John H. 
Muccio, U.S. Ambassador to Korea from 1949 to 1952, summed up the general American 
consensus at the time.  United States policy since 1947 was against getting involved militarily 
[in Korea], he claimed.22  Niles Bond, a member of General Douglas MacArthurs political 
advisory staff reinforces this sentiment.   The military never felt, and I dont think the political 
side of the government did either, that we had any long term interest in Korea, he stated.23  The 
unwillingness of the government of the Republic of Korea to cooperate with the United States,  
 
 
                                                
21 Shu Guang Zhang, Maos Military Romanticism, China and the Korean War, 1950-1953, p. 10. 
22 McKinzie, Oral interview of John J. Muccio. 
23 McKinzie, Oral interview of Niles W. Bond. 
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which itself derived from the belief that South Korea had simply traded Japanese overlords for 
American ones, contributed greatly to the United States desire to quit Korea.24 
 The United States was aware that the possibility of a North Korean invasion of the ROK 
existed but in the face of myriad Communist threats worldwide, the defense of South Korea was 
not deemed an over-riding concern.  Additionally, the threat of Communist Chinese aid to such 
an invasion was completely overlooked.  On September 25, 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
submitted an evaluation report to President Truman.  The report claimed that the continued 
maintenance of 45,000 men  in South Korea could only be justified if the Soviets establish 
military strength in [North] Korea capable of mounting an assault on Japan (italics added).  
Furthermore, the report advocated U.S. withdrawal from Korea based on a projected increase in 
internal disorder.  Unless the U.S. was willing to invest in South Korea on a massive scale, such 
conditions would eventually render the American presence untenable and would result in the 
U.S. being forced to withdraw under conditions of duress.  In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs, it 
was better to withdraw before such events came to pass.25 
 American withdrawal was further facilitated by U.S. military claims that the ROKA was 
fully capable of defending South Korea.  On March 22, 1949, General Douglas MacArthur 
claimed that ROK security forces were trained and combat-ready.26  General Omar Bradley, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, received a similar assessment from the Chief of the U.S. 
Korean Military Advisory Group in the ROK, General William L. Roberts, who claimed,  [The 
ROKA could] meet any test the North Koreans imposed on it.27 
 Balancing the American feeling of frustration with South Korea was official United 
States policy.  The National Security Council study (NSC-68) clearly defined American  
                                                
24 Jerry N. Hess, Oral interview of John J. Muccio. 18 February 1971, document located at  
     http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/muccio1.htm. 
25 Truman, Memoirs, pp. 318, 325-326, 331. 
26 Ibid., p. 329. 
27 Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A Generals Life, p. 530 
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determination to contain the spread of communism, explicitly stating that the United States 
would not tolerate Soviet aggression, no matter where it occurred.  The United States would act 
regardless of whether the Soviet Union or one of its proxies initiated aggression and without 
consideration for the strategic value of the victimized nation.28 
 By early 1950, the Truman administration had determined that South Korea was not 
sufficiently important, from a strategic standpoint, to warrant American military action to 
prevent a North Korean takeover.29  General Douglas MacArthur and Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson had clearly conveyed this fact to the world in their definitions of the United States 
defensive perimeter in Asia, both of which had excluded Korea and Taiwan.30  Congressional 
defeat of the Korean Aid Bill and President Trumans speech on January 5, 1950 further 
confirmed this decision.  Stalin and Mao seem to have interpreted this as American indifference 
to Kim Il Sungs planned military reunification of Korea. 
It is important at this point to note that the United States believed, as the title of NSC-7 
(The Position of the United States with Respect to Soviet-Directed World Communism) 
suggested, that communism was a Soviet-directed worldwide plot to achieve global dominance. 
Accordingly, the United States would view the NKPAs military action against South Korea as a 
Soviet challenge to American resolve.  As such, it would require a response.  Washingtons 
indifference toward the fate of the Korean Peninsula may seem inconsistent with the American 
determination to confront Soviet expansionism; however, United States actions did not 
contradict United States policy.  Careful extrapolation reveals the true American message that, 
while Washington would not tolerate Soviet-sponsored aggression, it would accede to North 
Korean subjugation of South Korea by any non-military means. 
                                                
28 U.S. National Security Council NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, sections   
    III, V and Conclusions. Document located at http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/nsc-68/nsc68-1.htm. 
29 Kathryn Weathersby, New Findings on the Korean War, p. 14. 
30 Roe, The Dragon Strikes, pp. 5, 21-22 and Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years at the State  
    Department, pp. 355-358. 
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 The United States initiated these actions based on official estimates of Soviet capabilities 
and intentions, which NSC-7 and NSC-68 incorporated into their text.31  The Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) provided these estimates on an annual basis.  In 1948, the CIA correctly noted, 
Prevailing conditions throughout the Far East continue to be adverse to U.S. strategic interests 
and favorable to the extension of Soviet influence.32  In May 1949, the CIA concluded that the 
Soviet Union had no interest in Korea and would confine its activities to Scandinavia, 
Yugoslavia and Iran.  In the Agencys view, Moscow was, unlikely to resort to even localized 
direct military action, except possibly with respect to Finland and Yugoslavia.33   As late as 
February 20, 1950, though continuing to cite American vulnerability in the Far East, the CIA still 
demonstrated a muddled view of the regional events.  The CIA continued to argue that the Soviet 
Union would be preoccupied with asserting its control over Communist China and that 
Communist efforts in Asia would be confined to Indochina.34  It thus becomes clear that United 
States Euro-centric view of world affairs precluded it from accurately predicting Communist 
intentions in the Far East. 
Washingtons errors in identifying possible Communist intentions were not confined to 
its assessment of the Soviet Union.   Dean Achesons abrupt dismissal of China as a regional 
power with his statement, China, even under communism, cannot be a springboard for attack,35 
highlighted a disastrous underestimation of Communist Chinese capabilities.  Dean Acheson 
based his assessment, in part, on the belief that Communist China would be preoccupied with 
consolidating power in its newly established nation, following the CCFs victory over the 
 
                                                
31 USNSC, NSC-7, The Position of the United States with Respect to Soviet-Directed World Communism, Analysis,  
    document located at http://humanities.uwe.ac.uk/corehistorians/powers/tect/s17forei.htm#Title.  See also   
    USNSC, NSC-68, section V. 
32 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Review of the World Situation, 14 July 1948, p. 7. 
33 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, The Possibility of Direct Soviet Military Action During 1949, 3 May 1949, p. 2. 
34 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Intentions and Capabilities, 20 February 1950, pp. 17-18. 
35 Quoted in Roe, The Dragon Strikes, p. 20. 
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Nationalist forces.36  Therefore, the U. S. assumed that China would attempt to avoid any 
involvement in regional affairs.   
           The American militarys misguided denigration of CCF capabilities underlay Achesons 
judgement.  However, the United States had done the CCF a grave injustice by basing these 
estimates on select portions of reports, which the U.S. Dixie Mission advisors had filed during 
World War II. Though these reports had indicated the superiority of Communist over Nationalist 
forces and had even predicted Communist victory in the event of a Chinese civil war, American 
observers tended to focus on Nationalist incompetence.  The statement by General David G. 
Barr, advisor to Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek, best demonstrated the American opinion of 
Chinese Communist forces. Their [i.e., the GMDs] military debacles in my opinion can be 
attributed to the worlds worst leadership [,] . . . the complete ineptness of high military leaders 
and the widespread corruption and dishonesty throughout the Armed Forces.37  Thus, American 
estimates of Chinese Communist capabilities were based on observations of Chinese Nationalist 
forces. 
Other American actions contributed to the false impression of American intent. 
Washington, for example, did not intervene on behalf of the Nationalist forces prior to their 
expulsion from the mainland.38  The withdrawal of U. S. troops from the Far East served as 
another signal of the American desire to avoid confrontation.  Between 1947 and 1950, The 
United States had reduced its defensive forces in the region by more than half.39  To make 
matters worse, the forces that remained were not only under-strength, but also under-funded and 
outfitted primarily with obsolete World War II-era equipment.40  Though these actions were the 
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result of larger national considerations, they reinforced the Communist belief that the United 
States would not intervene on the Asian mainland. 
Washingtons implementation of its Far East foreign policy combined with inaccurate 
estimates of Soviet and Chinese intentions to assist in establishing the conditions for war in 
Korea.  The United States failure to recognize the geographical and strategic importance of 
Korea to the Soviet Union and Communist China was pivotal in undermining the ability of the 
Truman administration to convey accurately its intentions in the region.  The Soviet Union and 
the PRC also contributed by underestimating their adversary and failing to communicate clearly.  
Closer examination of pre-war negotiations reveals the extent of those errors and their impact on 




PRELUDE TO INVASION 
For some time, Historians generally held the Soviet Union responsible for the Korean 
Conflict. However, facts now reveal that responsibility for initiating the hostilities lies with Kim 
Il Sung and the Peoples Democratic Republic of Korea.  It is true that the USSR and Communist 
China contributed to the conflict with their agreement to support the NKPAs assault on South 
Korea, but, at most, they were only accomplices.  However, while the Soviet Union took 
measures to ensure that it would not become entangled in the conflict, the Chinese fell prey to 
their misperception of events.  Mao Zedong grossly underestimated the American commitment 
to contain Communist aggression while exaggerating both the abilities of the NKPA and the 
commitment of the Soviet Union to provide assistance in the event of an extended conflict.  
Chinas errors would result in economic stagnation and political isolation from the West, as it 
found itself bogged down in an extended war of attrition with the United States. 
Kim Il Sung initially broached the topic of NKPA military action against South Korea to 
Stalin during a meeting on March 7, 1949.  We believe that the situation makes it necessary and 
possible to liberate the country through military means, he told the Soviet dictator.  At this time, 
just as he would for the next six months, Stalin declined to sanction military action by citing the 
weakness of the NKPA and the USSR-US agreement, which divided Korea at the 38th parallel.  
Stalin further clarified that the Soviet Union would aid North Korea only if it were the victim of 
foreign aggression. Kim suffered Soviet refusal once again before Stalin ordered further study of 
the question.   
            However, this too elicited a negative response on the grounds that the NKPA was 





south.41  Finally, on January 30, 1950, Stalin agreed to meet with Kim Il Sung to discuss Soviet 
support for a NKPA invasion.42 
What was it that caused Stalin to suddenly change his mind and agree to support the 
NKPA?  It is possible that Stalin had initially feared American intervention could develop into a 
nuclear confrontation.  When the Soviets proved their own nuclear capability in September 1949, 
this threat was diminished.  Although the Soviet arsenal of atomic weapons must have been tiny 
at this point in time, it still constituted a viable counter threat.  Additionally, Stalin must have 
been aware that the United States nuclear arsenal was extremely limited.  Soviet spies, most 
notably Donald Maclean, would surely have passed on to the USSR the fact that the United 
States could claim only thirty assembled nuclear weapons by March 1948.43  NATO force 
deficiencies and its developing reliance on nuclear weapons to maintain the balance of power in 
Western Europe combined with Soviet possession of the atomic bomb would surely have 
precluded American commitment of those weapons in any conflict in Korea.   
The nuclear threat being relatively equal, confrontation, should it occur, would rely on 
conventional forces.  As the Soviet Union (and the PRC) enjoyed a marked numerical superiority 
in this arena, Stalin probably felt renewed confidence in his ability to aggressively engage the 
U.S. diplomatically.  However, Stalin was still aware that American intervention in a Korean 
conflict could develop in to a direct U.S.-USSR confrontation. This was something, which 
neither side desired as it could, in turn lead to all-out nuclear war.  Thus, in December 1949 
Stalin made two facts clear to Kim.  Stalin did not feel Korea was of sufficient strategic 
importance to warrant a conflict with the United States and the Soviet Union had no intention of  
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allowing itself to become entangled should the United States intervene.44  Having made his 
position clear, Stalin gave his support to Kim and the NKPA.   
 An additional factor, which could have influenced Stalins decision, is that he desperately 
needed a victory with which he could counter Communist political reversals in Europe.  Allied 
defeat of the Soviet blockade of Berlin, the creation of NATO, and the establishment of the 
government of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Allied western zone of occupation had 
caused the Soviets considerable loss of prestige.  Kim Il Sungs tenacious pursuit of Soviet 
assistance and his optimistic predictions for success would have provided Stalin the opportunity 
to counter political setbacks in Europe with a Communist victory in Korea.  Indeed, Soviet 
Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov claims that Stalins acquiescence was the result of Kims 
prediction that the war would last only three days. Kim further claimed 200,000 party members 
and Communist guerrilla forces operating in the southern provinces of South Korea would 
provide additional support. Stalin agreed that he would meet again with Kim in April 1950 to 
begin planning logistical support for the NKPA, but stated that the final Soviet decision would be 
contingent on Maos approval of the invasion. 
 Kim Il Sung traveled to Beijing in mid-May for talks with Mao Zedong. When Kim 
informed Mao of his intention to reunify Korea by force, Mao objected to the timing of Kims 
proposed action and attempted to dissuade him from conducting operations until the Chinese had 
concluded their civil war.  But Mao was unable to cite a valid reason for withholding Chinese 
support.45  Since the Communist Chinese were currently engaged in actively reunifying China, it 
was impossible to deny the same opportunity to North Korea.  This was a fact known to the 
North Koreans and they used it to secure Maos approval.46 
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Several factors influenced Maos decision.  Support of North Korea would demonstrate 
Chinas loyalty to communism and favorably influence relations with the Soviet Union.  This, in 
turn, would probably give the PRC access to the acquisition of Soviet military equipment and 
training, which it sorely needed.  Communist Chinas disastrous attempts to capture the 
Nationalist-held islands of Matsu and Quemoy had made it brutally clear that the CCFs lack of 
air and sea power would have to be rectified if it was to subjugate Taiwan. 
The projected action in Korea also held out the prospect of an increase in Chinas 
international prestige at little or no cost to the Chinese.  Support of North Korea would bolster 
Chinas appeal as the Asian model for budding revolutionary states to emulate.  If the NKPAs 
assault could achieve a lightning-fast victory over the ROKA, China stood to gain without 
actually having to commit troops to the conflict.  Additionally, such a victory would ensure that 
the Communist maintained control of the Korean peninsula.  Such control would guarantee the 
security of Chinas industrial basin in Manchuria. 
Mao dismissed the significance of possible American intervention. As regards the 
Americans, there is no need to be afraid of them, he remarked to Kim in May 1950.  The 
Americans will not enter a third world war for such a small territory.47  Should the  United 
States choose to intervene, Mao believed it would be impotent to affect the outcome of what 
promised to be a quick conquest of the Republic of Korea by the NKPA.  Mao seems to have had 
little doubt that the Americans would be unable to react quickly enough to prevent the collapse 
of the ROKA.  In effect, the United States would be presented with a fait accompli. 
Mao knew that Communist Chinas military and economic situation mediated against 
prolonged involvement in a Korean conflict.  On December 16, 1949, Mao acknowledged to 
Stalin, China needs a period of 3-5 years . . . to bring the economy back to pre-war levels and to 
stabilize the country in general. He added, Chinese forces are inadequate to effectively fight 
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against imperialist aggression.48  Chinas economy was in shambles following the civil war.  
Communist forces were still engaged in pacifying large parts of the mainland and attempting to 
neutralize approximately 400,000 Nationalist guerrillas.  Mao was acutely aware of his nations 
shortcomings, yet was still willing to support North Korea. This would seem to indicate that Mao 
believed the commitment of Chinese forces would be for a limited duration, if it was required at 
all. 
In light of these facts, it seems highly improbable that Communist China would commit 
itself to a venture that would require an extended, large-scale commitment of Chinese military 
forces.  Perhaps the Chinese believed the NKPA was capable of completing its conquest without 
assistance, or that only minimal CCF troop commitments would be required.  However, should 
China be drawn into a prolonged conflict, it could rest secure in the knowledge that the recently 
completed Sino-Soviet Treaty would guarantee Soviet assistance. 
Facts also indicate that, contrary to Maos claims, China was aware of Soviet-North 
Korean plans for the invasion of the ROK.  Proof of Maos knowledge lies in the circumstances 
surrounding the transfer of 23,000 Chinese troops of Korean descent, along with all of their 
equipment, to North Korea.  On January 19, 1950, Kim requested that China return 14,000 of 
these troops and their equipment.  Not only did China comply, but it also promised to send food 
aid and to transfer an army closer to the border in case of Japanese intervention.49 On January 19 
Kim initiated the formal request and submitted it to China.  The request was approved on 
January 22.50  According to Nie Rongzhen (Acting Chief of Staff and Army Marshal), he  
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completed the transfer of these troops and their equipment in accordance with the instructions 
from the leading members of the Chinese Communist Partys (CCP) Central Committee.51   
Mao was the de facto power in the CCP.  Therefore, it would not be possible for the CCP 
to approve this transfer or offer the additional assistance promised above without Maos direct 
knowledge or concurrence.  The unusual speed associated with the CCPs consideration and 
approval of the request also lends credence to the belief that Mao was aware of the intended 
purpose of the transfer. It is possible he sought to expedite matters in order to assist the NKPA in 
the integration of these troops.  Whatever the reasons, it is clear Mao had chosen to support 
North Korea in its efforts at reunification. 
Examination of events indicates that, contrary to United States belief, the Soviet Union 
did not instigate the conflict in Korea.  Rather, it would seem Kim Il Sung was the chief 
proponent and, through constant pressure and political maneuver, succeeded in gaining the 
support of both the Soviet Union and Communist China.  But while Stalin had bluntly informed 
Kim that the USSR would not become entangled militarily,52 Mao left the commitment of 
Chinese troops open to question.  It is here that the United States inability to convey its level of 
determination to contain communism made its impact felt by leading Mao to believe it would not 
commit troops in defense of a strategically unimportant location such as Korea.   
Just as Mao had underestimated the Americans, so, too, did he exaggerate the Soviet 
commitment to provide support in the event of an extended conflict.  Mao drew comfort from the 
Sino-Soviet Treaty and its assurance of mutual assistance.  What Mao failed to heed was the fact 
that this treaty contained no specifics on just what sort of military assistance would be provided 
or, more importantly, whether the recipient thus assumed an obligation to pay for this  
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assistance.53  Stalin had already made it clear that he would not commit ground troops to the 
invasion of South Korea.  In light of this fact, Maos failure to clarify the treatys stipulations 
ensured that the PRC would bear the brunt of the war effort through its compulsion to provide 
ground forces.  It also ensured that the requirement to buy arms and ammunition would delay 
Chinas economic development. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE NORTH KOREAN PEOPLES ARMY STRIKES 
 
At 4:40 a.m. on June 25, 1950 the NKPA began its assault on the Republic of Korea.54 The 
ROKA fought valiantly, but in vain, hampered by inherent deficiencies.  NKPA forces seized 
Seoul, the South Korean capital, on June 29th.  The United States decision on June 27th to 
intervene came as a shock to the Communists.  Both the level and speed of Washingtons 
commitment gave Mao cause for concern. Chinese caution ensured that preparations for possible  
                                                





American intervention were already underway, but events now forced Mao to accelerate their 
implementation. While the NKPA offensive ground to a halt at the Naktong River, Mao pushed 
his commanders with increasing anxiety. Chinese intervention, however, arrived too late. 
General MacArthurs amphibious landing of UNC forces at Inchon effectively ended Maos 
hopes to use the combined forces of the NKPA and the CCF to secure the peninsula before the 
United States could commit its forces in strength. 
The requirement to prevent South Korean aggression against North Korea had guided the 
United States in developing the ROKA.  U.S. Ambassador John Muccio best summed up the 
dilemma facing the United States.  Given that Rhee and Kim were no different in their desire to 
unite their country militarily, the United States had no choice but to provide South Korea only 
limited arms and equipment, he said.  Had the South acquired the ability to invade the North, 
they would have done so without hesitation.55  Niles Bond supports this view by adding if 
Syngman Rhee had had more equipment, its entirely possible that he would have used it himself 
against the North Koreans.56  The result was limited American aid in terms of equipment, 
maintenance and training.   
By June 1950, only 25 percent of the ROKA had completed battalion-level training, 35 
percent of its weapons were unserviceable due to lack of spare parts and 10 to 15 percent of these 
weapons were completely unusable.  The United States had refused to supply tanks or combat 
aircraft.  Additionally, it provided artillery, anti-tank weapons and mines in insufficient 
quantities for the task now facing the ROKA.57  Despite these deficiencies, the ROKA made a 
valiant, if futile, effort to repel the invaders.  By the evening of June 26, 1950, Soviet advisors  
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acknowledged that, contrary to their expectations, there had been no mass surrenders of ROKA 
units.58  Likewise, the United States claimed that not a single ROKA unit had defected to the 
NKPA.59 
 The NKPA boasted an overwhelming superiority not only in the number of front-line 
combat personnel, but also in numbers and quality of combat equipment.  NKPA forces 
contained between 125 and 258 Soviet T-34 tanks, assigned to the 105th Tank Brigade, and 1600 
artillery pieces.60  The North Korean Air Force commanded 178 combat aircraft. Additionally, 
the North Koreans had several detachments of coastal naval vessels, one of which seized the port 
city of Urutsyn via amphibious assault on June 25.  Official Soviet estimates claim that the 
NKPA had 2 to 1 superiority in personnel and artillery over the ROKA.  In armored forces this 
ratio was 6.5 to 1 and in combat aircraft it was 6 to 1. 
 The NKPA also had its own problems.  On June 26, Soviet advisors reported that the 
NKPA headquarters had lost communications with all of its divisions on the first day of combat 
and, as a result, the NKPA operated without direct guidance. These advisors also noted that the 
command staff, lacking adequate combat experience, failed to employ armor and artillery 
effectively. 61  These flaws would soon prove fatal for the NKPA. 
 The United States initial reaction to the outbreak of hostilities was surprise, although 
prior to hostilities, the U.S. KMAG had analyzed NKPA deployments correctly as preparatory to 
war and had reported these findings.62  Despite the shock, the United States reacted quickly.  On 
June 27, 1950, President Truman ordered United States air and naval forces to support the 
ROKA in its defensive efforts.  Truman also acted to contain the war by ordering the U.S. 7th  
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Fleet into the Taiwan Straits. This was a preemptive move according to Congressman Walter 
Judd.  Its purpose was to . . . prevent any military action across the Formosan [Taiwan] Straits, 
he said.  The 7th Fleet would prevent Red China from attacking Taiwan and called upon the 
government of free China . . . not to take any action against the mainland.63  This was followed 
by the United States commitment of ground forces to the conflict on June 30. 
 The United States did not arrive at the decision to intervene without heated debate.  Many 
government officials believed that the United States should stay out of the conflict.  General 
Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recognized the requirement to stand up to 
Soviet aggression, but led the faction opposed to American intervention, citing the lack of 
American interests in Korea and the need to maintain adequate force levels in Western Europe.64  
American intervention would be based in part on NSC-68, the United States policy of 
containing Communist expansion.  A more practical view was spelled out in a document studied 
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  The Joint Strategic Survey Committee produced the report on June 
29, 1950.  The capitulation of South Korea to North Korea is unacceptable to the United 
States, it stated.  [O]ur nation cannot afford the resultant loss of prestige and leadership, 
together with the inevitable defection of certain minor and possibly certain major powers now 
allied with the United States, not only in Asia but throughout the world.65  In short, the United 
States decision to intervene was based not on any particular sense of South Koreas strategic or 
geographical value.  Rather, it was based on the requirement for the United States to retain its 
credibility, the loss of which could well have served to undermine the fledgling alliance of 
NATO in Western Europe. 
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 In a surprising turn of events, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) voted to 
assist South Korea and the United States in their defensive efforts.  Neither the Soviet Union nor 
China had counted on UN intervention.  They probably assumed the USSR would exercise its 
UNSC veto right, thereby precluding the UN commitment of forces.  For whatever reason, the 
Soviet Ambassador to the UN was absent when the voting occurred and failed to veto UN action.  
On July 7, 1950, General MacArthur assumed command of UN forces in Korea.66 As Syngman 
Rhee had already given command of South Korean forces, including paramilitary, police and 
youth corps units, to General MacArthur, this left him as the Supreme Allied Commander in 
Korea.67 
 The directive sent by the Joint Chiefs to MacArthur was simple: his mission was to 
provide fullest possible support to South Korean forces and to clear South Korea of North 
Korean forces.  The JCS believed it crucial to reinforce General MacArthur as a matter of 
urgency and wanted him to drive the North Koreans north of latitude 38 degrees North. 68  It 
is important to note that at this point in time, the United States was restricting its operations to 
the area south of the 38th parallel.   
 U. S. military forces engaged the NKPA on July 4, 1950 with shocking results.  The U.S. 
Armys inexperience, outdated equipment, and piecemeal commitment to battle resulted in a 
decisive victory for the NKPA.  Over the next two months, the United States conducted a 
fighting withdrawal for approximately 150 miles.69  This debacle was the result of President 
Trumans efforts to reduce the size of American military forces following World War II.  Indeed, 
the U.S. militarys battlefield performance came as no surprise to informed government officials.  
There is no question in my mind, Karl Bendetsen, Assistant Secretary of the Army (1950-52)  
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recalled, that the military forces of the United States were entirely inadequate to deal with any 
actual emergency entailing operations of any significant degree.  He adds that downsizing had 
reduced ground force infantry regiments to four infantry companies, as opposed to the standard 
nine, and that artillery battalions consisted of only two batteries instead of three.70  The resulting 
performance of the Army caused the United States to examine other avenues for augmenting its 
forces while they corrected these deficiencies. 
 As early as July 14, 1950, the United States examined the feasibility of employing atomic 
weapons in Korea.  In assessing the possibility of either Soviet or Communist Chinese 
intervention on behalf of the NKPA, the United States determined that atomic weapons would be 
of no use.  The dearth of military targets, and a concomitant need to strike industrial (civilian) 
centers, led the United States to conclude that such terror attacks would have a significantly 
negative impact on world opinion.71  This would be even more pronounced if the U.S. used these 
weapons against the unassisted NKPA forces.  Frank Pace Jr., the Secretary of the Army    
(1950-53), thought that the use of atomic weapons in Korea was impractical as NATO was 
seeking to base its defensive posture in Western Europe on the implied threat of American 
nuclear retaliation against a Soviet invasion.    Should the United States use atomic weapons in 
Korea and should they prove ineffective, NATOs defense of Western Europe would be exposed 
as ineffective.72  In light of these assessments, the United States decided to continue its efforts 
using the conventional forces at hand.  
 During this time, the Communist Chinese were also examining contingencies, should 
events force them to intervene.  Immediately following the outbreak of hostilities, the Chinese 
recognized the requirement for an on-sight assessment of ongoing operations.  To this end, on  
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June 30, 1950 they dispatched Chai Chengwen, Director of Military Intelligence for the 
Southwestern Military District, and five other officers on an intelligence-gathering mission.  This 
group was ostensibly assigned to the Chinese embassy in North Korea and had the mission of 
analyzing the conditions and requirements for Chinese intervention.  The move was made to 
counter what the Chinese perceived as American-led aggression.  That perception, in turn, was 
based on American intervention in Korea and its interdiction of the Taiwan Straits, which China 
considered foreign interference in its internal affairs.73 
Initial Chinese planning began on July 7, 1950 with Zhou Enlais receipt of a message 
from Stalin stating that the Soviets consider it correct to concentrate immediately nine Chinese 
divisions on the Chinese-Korean border for volunteer actions in North Korea in case the enemy 
crosses the 38th parallel.  Coming less than two weeks after the start of the invasion, this was a 
clear indicator of Stalins lack of faith in the NKPA.  Mao concurred in the requirement to 
provide a deterrent to a UNC advance to the Yalu River and opted to establish the Northeast 
Border Defense Army (NEBDA) in Manchuria on July 7.  The Chinese did not inform the 
Soviets of their compliance with the USSR recommendation until after July 13.74  
According to Maos orders, the CCF was to concentrate the Chinese 38th, 39th, 40th and 
42nd Armies in Manchuria.75  These forces were among the best in the CCF.76 NEBDA had a 
total manpower strength of 260,000 soldiers.  In addition to four infantry armies (twelve infantry 
divisions), NEBDA contained three artillery divisions, three anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) 
regiments, one tank regiment, one engineer regiment, three truck transportation regiments, one 
defense artillery regiment and one cavalry regiment.77   
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The Chinese were well aware that such a large-scale redeployment of forces could serve 
as an indicator of possible intervention.  As such, they attempted to conceal the actual size of 
their mass relocation of troops.  The movement of Chinese units did not escape American 
attention, but United States intelligence analysts quickly dismissed it as the return of Manchurian 
based units to their original garrisons following the end of the Chinese Civil War.78 
In August 1950, as the NKPA offensive slowed to a halt, Mao became increasingly aware 
that the UNC, if allowed a respite, would be able to project more forces into Korea.  As such, the 
requirement for the quick expulsion of the remaining UNC forces from the Korean Peninsula 
became critical.  Mao also began to realize that only direct Chinese intervention might be 
sufficient to accomplish this task.  Mao made this clear on August 4, 1950 at a meeting of the 
CCP and succeeded in provoking extensive debate on the state of the CCF.  The next day he 
ordered that the NEBDA be prepared to conduct offensive operations in Korea by the end of 
September.79  It seems likely that Mao was attempting to avoid a protracted conflict by 
committing Chinese forces to Korea before UNC forces could establish a tenable defense, 
thereby pre-empting any UNC offensive action. 
The UNC amphibious assault on Inchon on September 15, 1950 signaled the end of 
Maos hopes.  The NKPA, which had continued its relentless assaults against the UNCs 
defensive line, the Pusan Perimeter, had ignored Soviet and Chinese warnings of a possible 
UNC amphibious assault.80  North Koreas refusal to initiate any precautionary measures against 
such a possibility now left the bulk of the NKPA exposed to the threat of envelopment.  On 
September 18, Stalin had recommended the redeployment of the NKPA to meet the threat, which 
the UNC landing created, but Kim would not comply until September 25.81  By that time, it was  
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too late.  UNC forces encircled and destroyed the NKPAs 1st and 2nd Armies, annihilating 
almost fourteen North Korean divisions and recapturing Seoul. The route to the 38th parallel lay 
undefended before the UNC forces.82 
 By September 29, only two weeks after the assault on Inchon, North Korean 
officials acknowledged that the NKPA had begun to disintegrate and that it was able to offer 
only negligible resistance to advancing enemy forces.83  While the Chinese hurried to ready their 
forces, the Soviets reacted with increased tactical guidance to the remaining NKPA elements.  
They also began to distance themselves from the conflict by recalling Soviet advisors from 
Korea and exerting increased pressure on the Chinese to commit troops.84  On October 1, Stalin 
officially requested Chinese intervention into the Korean War.85  The time had come for China to 
decide. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE CHINESE DECISION TO INTERVENE 
 China had been willing to intervene in the Korean War prior to the UNC landing at 
Inchon but the Chinese Military had been unable to complete its preparations.  The Central 
Military Commissions (CMC) August 5, 1950 message, requesting that NEBDA be prepared to 
conduct offensive operations in Korea by early September,86 and the ongoing battle planning of 
NEBDA commanders87 clearly illustrate Maos readiness to commit his forces.  But Mao had 
based his plans on a joint venture with the NKPA.  Its imminent collapse now caused him to 
reevaluate the conditions under which Chinese troops would be required to face the UNC. As 
UNC advance elements crossed the 38th parallel, Mao examined the military forces involved.  He 
also contemplated the limits of Soviet support and the increasing threat to Chinese national 
security.   
           By late September 1950, Mao had begun to realize only immediate intervention by 
Chinese forces in Manchuria (NEBDA) would prevent the total collapse of North Koreas efforts 
at reunification.  Neither the PRC nor the USSR was sure how far UNC forces would advance 
while attempting to liberate South Korea.88  The question relevant to Chinese preparations was 
whether the UNC would cross north of the 38th parallel.  If the UNC confined its operations to 
South Korea, then the NKPA would have time to regain its equilibrium.  NKPA and Chinese 
forces could establish a defensive line along the old border and resume offensive operations at 
their leisure.  A UNC attack into North Korea would pose a more prominent threat to Chinas 
national security. 
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           It is fairly clear that, with the exception of General MacArthur, the United States had no 
desire to provoke a conflict with Red China. However, the Chinese perception of Americas 
intent was quite different. On January 5, 1950, President Truman had stated that the United 
States had no desire to interfere in Chinas internal affairs.  Yet following the outbreak of 
hostilities in Korea, one of the United States first actions had been to dispatch the U.S. 7th fleet 
to prevent any military operations in the Formosan Straits.  To the Chinese, this action, executed 
under the guise of localizing the ongoing conflict in Korea, was a direct and blatant American 
assault on their national sovereignty and was equivalent to a United States declaration of war.   
 The presence of UNC troops on the Chinese-Korean border would pose a dire threat to 
China and to Manchuria in particular.  Mao believed if he allowed the UNC to establish a 
permanent presence on the border, then the United States would eventually arrange an  
incident as pretext for an invasion.  Nor was this belief restricted to Mao.  Many Chinese 
government officials and subordinate level commanders in the CCF shared his opinion.89 
 Chiang Kai-sheks offer of 30,000 Nationalist Chinese troops for use by the UNC in 
Korea further exacerbated Chinese suspicions of American aggression.  General MacArthurs 
actions and statements added to the plausibility that the U. S. might use Nationalist troops.   
MacArthur personally conducted an inspection trip to Taiwan early in the summer of 1950.  
General MacArthurs and Chiang Kai-sheks statements on the determination of the United 
States and Taiwan to combat communism in Asia created, in Maos view, the illusion of a joint 
conspiracy against the Peoples Republic of China.90  Mao believed these events served to 
underscore the inevitability of a military confrontation between the United States and the PRC. 
 Mao probably harbored a personal dislike and mistrust of the Soviet Union and Stalin in 
particular, based on past differences of opinion.  However, unlike the United States, the Soviet  
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Union and China were both Communist regimes and should therefore work together.  The United 
States had demonstrated its lack of tolerance for both revolutionary and Communist movements.  
In the Philippines, American forces were engaged in eliminating the Hukabalahop rebels.  In 
French Indochina, the United States provided support to French forces battling Communist-
backed rebels.  Maos official recognition of North Vietnams Communist government on 
January 17, 1950 did nothing to promote better diplomatic relations with the United States.91  As 
China was both a revolutionary movement and a Communist government, it found itself at 
growing odds with the United States. 
 The strain in diplomatic relations between the PRC and the U. S. originated during World 
War II.  It began with President Roosevelts refusal to meet with Mao in 1944. This was 
followed by the U.S. Armys withdrawal of its Dixie Mission advisory members from 
Communist units, though American advisors remained with the Nationalist forces.  In 1945, 
following the collapse of the Japanese Army, U.S. Army units seized Tsingtao, Tientsin and 
Chingwantao to prevent their occupation by Communist forces.92  The United States showed its 
preference for the nationalist forces by providing them equipment, supplies and transport 
throughout most of their battle against the Communists during the Chinese Civil War. 
 Matters continued to deteriorate between 1945 and 1950.  In November 1948, the 
Communist Chinese government tried, convicted and expelled U.S. Consul Angus Ward for 
espionage.  On August 5, 1949, Secretary of State Dean Acheson made reference to Communist 
Chinas subservience to the Soviet Union in somewhat harsh tones.  China perceived it as an 
indirect threat, eliciting Mao to respond that the United States was Chinas most dangerous 
enemy.93  There was also the ongoing dispute over the United Nations recognition of the  
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Chinese Nationalist government.  The United States proposed the measure for recognition but 
deliberately refused the same recognition for the Chinese Communist government.  This was a 
major source of contention to the PRC and elicited heated complaints.94  Chinese anti-American 
rhetoric reached its boiling point in 1950, when, on June 28, Mao Zedong addressed the 8th 
meeting of the Central Peoples Government Council.  In this speech, Mao reacted strongly to 
the presence of the U.S. 7th Fleet in the Formosan Straits and called for all nations to unite 
against American imperialism.95   
Mao recognized three possible locations for a confrontation with the United States.  The 
first of these was Taiwan.  Communist Chinese military actions in this region had already 
demonstrated the CCFs deficiency in naval and air power.  Given the overwhelming American 
superiority in these two areas, a confrontation in Taiwan would be a disaster for Chinese arms.  
The second choice was Vietnam, but extended supply lines, required for the support of the CCF, 
precluded its acceptance as a likely area for confrontation.  In the end, it was the United States 
who chose the battleground.  The presence of the U.S. Army in Korea was an open invitation to 
Mao for confrontation in that it offered China relatively short lines of communication and 
supply.  Moreover, the U.S. Army was already engaged against a Chinese ally, granting a pretext 
for Chinese intervention.  Mao had only to decide what forces to commit. 
The CCF had ballooned into a massive organization between the end of World War II 
and the withdrawal of the remaining Nationalist forces to Taiwan in 1949.  The CCFs 
absorption of defecting Nationalist units had contributed a large amount of manpower and a 
limited number of trained specialists but equipment and training of individual units varied 
greatly.  The CCF was a force in dire need of reorganization, re-equipping and modernization.  
As of July 15, 1950, the CCF contained approximately 5,138,756 soldiers comprising over 250  
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divisions.  The bulk of these divisions constituted four CCF field armies and two army groups.  
The Chinese command considered only half of these forces to be combat effective.96   
Though the four field armies were at full strength, the quality of troops and the number of 
assigned divisions differed greatly from field army to field army. The Chinese 1st Field Army, 
located in northwestern China, contained thirty-four divisions and was engaged in pacifying the 
province of Xinjiang.  The Chinese 2nd Field Army, located in western China, contained forty-
nine divisions and was preparing to invade Tibet.  The Chinese 3rd Field Army, with seventy-two 
divisions, was on Chinas east coast preparing to invade Taiwan.  The Chinese 4th Field Army 
was operating with its fifty-nine divisions along the southern coast of China and was engaged in 
reducing Nationalist guerrilla forces.  There were also thirty-nine divisions stationed in northern 
China, which constituted a strategic reserve.  Additionally, the Chinese 13th Army Group (nine 
divisions) was located at Zhengzou in the Henan province and the Chinese 9th Army Group (nine 
divisions) was garrisoned near Shanghai.  These army groups acted as strategic reserve and 
reserve for the 3rd Field Army.  Approximately 2.6 million soldiers augmented these units, 
serving in local defense units and construction corps.97 
 On July 13, 1950, Mao and the CMC officially designated the initial forces that would 
belong to NEBDA.  These consisted of the 38th, 39th and 40th Armies (13th Army Group) along 
with the 42nd Army (4th Field Army).  This created an initial force of twelve infantry divisions, 
which, along with supporting units, totaled almost 250,000 troops. NEBDA would exceed 
260,000 combat troops before the Chinese would rename it the Chinese Peoples Volunteer 
Force (CPVF) and commit it to combat in Korea. By the end of July, all of these units had 
completed their move to northeastern China.98 
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 With American military forces openly supporting South Korea, Mao and the CMC 
realized that overt Chinese intervention would almost certainly result in escalation to general 
war, should the joint efforts of the CCF and NKPA prove incapable of quickly overrunning the 
Korean peninsula.  To this end, it was decided that Chinese forces would enter Korea as 
volunteers, without the official support of the Peoples Republic of China.  Despite this, the 
threat of a general confrontation with the United States remained and the Chinese had to plan for 
this contingency.99 
 The possibility of American sponsored attacks on Chinese territory led the CMC to 
designate the 9th and 19th Army Groups, containing twelve and nine divisions respectively, as 
Chinas northeastern strategic reserve.  These units were to provide protection against attacks on 
Chinas coastal regions while retaining Chinas ability to counter a possible French thrust from 
Indochina or a Nationalist assault from Taiwan.  By late August 1950, events would force Mao 
to also designate them for inclusion in the CPVF.  On September 6, 1950, the 50th Army would 
move to Manchuria to assume border security duties.100 
 Communist China boasted an extremely large military, but appearances were deceptive.  
The Chinese Civil War had left the CCF under-equipped and under-trained.  The CCFs primary 
sources of supply for weapons during the civil war had been captured enemy stockpiles.  As a 
result, the CCF now found itself armed with a mixed assortment of American and Japanese 
equipment.  This made it almost impossible for the Chinese to establish supply operations based 
on a standardized organization.  Chinese army units found it necessary to swap weapons to 
achieve internal (unit) standardization.  The Chinese 38th Armys trade of its American weapons  
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for the 40th Armys Japanese weapons illustrates how common this action was and at what levels 
it occurred.101 
 Lack of adequate training also took its toll on the CCFs combat readiness.  The CCF 
could claim ownership of 410 aging Japanese and American armored fighting vehicles by May 
1950.  However, these tanks were scattered in small groups among the field armies, which 
precluded the CCF from effectively employing them as a decisive combat multiplier.  
Furthermore, as late as August 1950, Xu Guangda, 2nd Army Corps Commander, claimed that 
none of these units was operational due to lack of training.102 
 Adding to these problems were shortages of ammunition and basic equipment.  
Communist China was unable to produce sufficient amounts of ammunition to supply its forces. 
Indeed, China could produce only a few thousand tons per year compared to the United States 
ability to produce a million tons annually.  Marshal Nie Rongzhen cited that China could only 
produce 1,500 tons of the CPVFs required 14,100 tons of ammunition.  Exacerbating this 
problem were critical shortages in anti-tank weaponry, surface-to-air communications 
equipment, and trucks for both transportation and supply.103  
 While the CCF could claim a large number of combat soldiers, it suffered from a severe 
shortage of specialists among its personnel.  Prior to its commitment to combat in Korea, the 
CPVF support services required approximately 1,000 truck drivers and medical personnel.  Hong 
Xuezhi, Director of CPVF Logistics, claimed that, at the time of its establishment, the CPVF 
Logistics Department had a shortage of 1,560 managing officers, about 54 percent of its full 
strength.104 
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 The Soviet Union was able to alleviate some of these deficiencies for China.  Stalin 
proved more than willing, for a price, to supply China with equipment, ammunition and training.  
On July 27, 1950, Stalin initially addressed the matter of aid to China in a meeting with the 
Soviet Politburo.105  Although Stalin approved of aid to China, the Soviet Union would be unable 
to deliver the majority of that aid until after the CCF had intervened in Korea.   Even then, a 
large part of the equipment, which the Soviet Union would provide was 1930 vintage and not on 
par with American equipment. However, it was still better than what the Chinese currently 
owned. 
 Soviet deliveries began with the shipment of long-range artillery pieces.  The Chinese 
eventually received 4,000 artillery pieces and associated ammunition by the end of 1950. In late 
August 1950, Stalin provided 122 MIG-15 fighter aircraft and training personnel to China. 106  
Between October and December 1950, Stalin provided equipment and training to establish 
thirteen Chinese air regiments.107  The USSR also supplied large deliveries of armored fighting 
vehicles in October and November 1950, including training and equipment for the creation of ten 
Chinese tank regiments.108  By the end of the Korean War, Soviet deliveries to China had 
provided enough equipment for sixty-four infantry divisions and twenty-two air divisions.  These 
air divisions received approximately 372 Soviet MIG-15 fighter aircraft.  Additionally, the 
Soviet Union would provide 90 percent of Chinas wartime ammunition expenditures.109 
 Stalin did not confine his support of China to the delivery of equipment and training 
personnel.  He also provided Soviet troops for use in the defense of Chinese territory.  On 
November 3, 1950, the Soviet Union dispatched ten tank regiments to four major cities in  
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northern, eastern and northeastern China to assist in providing rear area security.  Stalin would 
also provide sixteen Soviet air regiments to China for use in Korea, though he would stipulate 
severe restrictions on their operations to prevent the appearance of overt Soviet intervention in 
the conflict.110 
 Stalins military aid to both China and North Korea illustrates his full support for the 
military reunification of Korea and the strengthening of Communist power in Asia.  That he 
accomplished this by providing equipment and advisory personnel, as opposed to direct Soviet 
military intervention, indicates his desire to avoid provoking a confrontation with the United 
States.  Stalin had made it clear to Kim that the Soviet Union would not be drawn into a Korean 
conflict prior to granting his approval of the operation.  While Stalin was not afraid of the United 
States and believed he could win such a conflict should it occur, he did recognize that escalation 
to general war served the interests of neither the United States nor the Soviet Union.  
Richard Thornton, in his book Odd Man Out, maintains that Stalin attempted to use the 
conflict to ensure Chinas subordination to the Soviet Union.  Specifically, he claims that Stalin 
deliberately failed to supply equipment in the amounts requested by Mao.  Yet, examination of 
Chinas requests reveals that the CCFs requirements were exceedingly large.  On November 8, 
1950, China requested 140,000 rifles with fifty-eight million rounds of ammunition, 7,000 light 
machine guns with thirty-seven million rounds of ammunition and 2,000 heavy machine guns 
with twenty million rounds of ammunition.111  On November 16, China requested fuel and 
lubricants amounting to approximately 17,000 tons and 6,000 barrels respectively.112  In light of 
these massive quantities and the Second World Wars drain on the Soviet economy, it is easy to 
understand the Soviet Unions inability to match supply with demand.  Simply put, the Soviet  
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Union was engaged in a cold war in Western Europe and could not afford to provide equipment 
in such quantities to both the Chinese and the North Koreans. 
 Mr. Thorntons claims that Stalin ensured the Chinese would enter the conflict without 
air cover also appear to be unfounded.  Stalin initially promised that he would try to provide air 
cover for the CPVF in a message to the Chinese Foreign Minister, Zhou Enlai on July 5, 
1950.113  In early October, Mao directed Zhou Enlai to confirm Soviet air support prior to 
ordering the CPVF into Korea.  On October 11, Zhou Enlai met with Stalin, who informed him 
that the Soviets were indeed prepared to provide the air cover.  A few hours after this meeting, 
Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov informed Zhou Enlai that this was not possible and that the 
Soviets would be unable to provide air cover for at least two and one half months.114  Yet, a little 
over one month later, Stalin would provide sixteen air regiments to China for use in Northern 
Korea.115 
 The reasons for Stalins uncharacteristic indecisiveness are the subject of much 
conjecture by Mr. Thornton.  The explanation that seems most plausible is Stalins insistence that 
the Soviet Union remain officially uninvolved in the conflict. Stalin was clearly aware of the 
United States stance against Soviet expansionism, which it had demonstrated by confronting the 
USSR in its attempt to blockade Berlin.  The U.S had also played a major role in the 
establishment of NATO, whose primary function was to safeguard Western Europe against 
Soviet expansionism.  Stalin probably had no desire to further test American determination. His 
decision to minimize Soviet involvement would be supported by the Politburo on numerous 
occasions in the months prior to Chinese intervention.116  In anticipation of events, the Soviet 
Union had acted to provide the Chinese with the necessary air cover by giving them fighter  
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aircraft and training Chinese pilots.  Soviet air units would thus be able to protect the Chinese-
Korean border, freeing up Chinese air units for operations in Korea itself.117 Mao himself 
provided the best summary of the situation.  Past hesitations by our comrades occurred because 
questions about the international situation, questions about the Soviet assistance to us, and 
questions about air cover were not clear to them.118 
 In addition to assessing the logistical shortcomings of the CCF, the Chinese also had to 
assess the comparative strengths and weaknesses of both their own and the American forces.  In 
assessing the U.S. Army, the Chinese erred in the same manner, as had the Americans.  Namely, 
their assessment of U.S Army capabilities in 1950 was based on its operations in Normandy, 
Western Europe and the South Pacific during World War II.  Yet, unlike the Americans, Hong 
Xuezhi claimed the Chinese were aware of their lack of current information. The CMC 
acknowledged the U.S. Army could claim superiority in modern weaponry, maneuverability and 
air/naval power.119  These strengths would have a major impact on CPVF operations in Korea. 
 United States air superiority would result in an increased threat of U.S Air Force strikes 
on CPVF logistical lines,  which hampered the replacement of Chinese combat losses in 
equipment and personnel.  The vulnerability of Chinese supply lines, and the invulnerability of 
American supply lines, despite their extended length, was clear to everyone except Mao.  While, 
General Peng Dehuai, Commander CPVF, stated this clearly in a meeting of the Chinese General 
Staff on August 8, 1950,120 Mao disagreed.  Mao claimed the length of the U.S. Armys supply 
lines would prove to be a burden without requiring Chinese interdiction.121 
 The greatest threat to CPVF operations lay in the marked firepower superiority of U.S. 
Army units.  Chinese army commanders recognized this peril and recommended the  
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strengthening of CPVF artillery assets and support services as a countermeasure.122 Mao 
estimated a force ratio of 4:1 in favor of the Chinese was required to overcome this handicap.123   
In response to this, upon committing the CPVF to operations in Korea, he ordered General Peng 
Dehuai to direct his operations primarily against ROKA units.  Despite these precautions, the 
Chinese expected to suffer 200,000 casualties within the first year of the war.124 
 By far, the most potent weapon in the United States arsenal was the atomic bomb.  That 
the Americans might employ the atomic bomb in the Korea War was a well-known fact in the 
Chinese 13th Army, whose soldiers had come to refer to the Yalu River bridges as the gates of 
hell.125  Mao was unperturbed by this threat.  He knew that the Soviet Unions possession of the 
atomic bomb provided a credible counter-balance.  Mao stated that several factors would 
preclude American employment of the atomic bomb in Korea. First of all, there was a dearth of 
potential targets as China was not an industrialized country and was therefore not overly 
susceptible to the effects of strategic bombing.  Second, use of the atomic bomb would subject 
the United States to severe international criticism, as well as stirring up moral conflict at home.  
Mao averred that, while these weapons could cause great destruction to China, their use would 
not be decisive in influencing the outcome of the Korean War. 126 
 The Chinese also responded by focusing their propaganda on promoting the theme of 
morale over technology, citing Chinas sustained resistance against Japan during World War II 
and Communist Chinese victories over the GMD.  In both of these struggles China had used 
determination and perseverance to overcome its technological inferiority.  Additionally, the 
United States had equipped, trained and advised the GMD. The defeat of the GMD surely  
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indicated that it was possible for Communist China to defeat the United States.  Chinese leaders 
claimed U.S. Army units were road-bound due to their heavy mechanization and relied too 
heavily on air and artillery supporting fires. CCF strengths in close quarter fighting, bayonet 
usage, night attacks, and envelopment techniques would serve to counter the Americans 
strengths. Chinese military leaders believed these strengths would ensure that battlefield 
initiative belonged to their soldiers.127 
 The stage was now set for China to enter the conflict.  China had analyzed both its own 
forces and those of its opponents.  It had taken steps to correct identified deficiencies and had 
utilized propaganda to ensure the spiritual commitment of its soldiers to fight.  But while China 
was busy planning a carefully phased entry into the conflict, two events occurred, which 
disrupted their timetable and forced the premature commitment of the CPVF to combat.  The 
first of these was the ROKA 3rd divisions crossing of the 38th parallel on October 1, 1950.  The 
second event was the UNC offensive, which would follow on October 8. 
 The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had ordered General MacArthur to clear South Korea of 
North Korean forces on June 29, 1950.128  The same JCS directive limited the UNC area of 
operations to South Korea.  On September 7, the JCS recommended to the U.S. Secretary of 
Defense that they allow ROKA elements to operate on both sides of the 38th parallel following 
the destruction of the NKPA, as these operations would probably be of a guerrilla nature.129  
Following presidential approval, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a new directive on September 
27, 1950, authorizing General MacArthur to conduct UNC operations above and below the 38th 
parallel, provided neither Chinese nor Soviet forces had entered Korea.  It explicitly emphasized 
the inviolability of the Chinese Manchurian border and further stated only South Korean units  
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would conduct operations in the northeastern provinces bordering China and the USSR.130  
Under the provisions of this directive, elements of the 3rd ROKA division crossed the 38th 
parallel into North Korea on October 1, 1950. 
 On October 7, the UN unleashed what they believed would be the coup de grace on 
North Korea.  The UN General Assembly approved a British-sponsored resolution, which 
authorized UNC forces to occupy all of North Korea in order to hold elections and provide for 
national reunification following the destruction of the NKPA.131  Armed with both UN and 
presidential approval, General MacArthur wasted no time in launching his offensive against the 
remnants of the NKPA.  On October 7, advance elements of the U.S. 1st Cavalry crossed into 
North Korea.  The rest of the Eighth Army and X Corps followed them the next day. 
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CHAPTER 5 
COUNTDOWN TO CONFRONTATION 
 Though China had hoped to be able to enter into the Korean War in early September 
1950, events would conspire to delay its operations until mid-October.  However, these events 
did not dictate the necessity of Chinese intervention.  Mao had made that decision as early as 
August 1950.  The changing situation affected China by forcing it to re-evaluate its plans prior to 
initiating offensive operations.  While Beijing prepared for war, Washington analyzed and 
dismissed the possibility of active Chinese intervention.  American intelligence failures and 
General MacArthurs personal agenda combined to ensure that the CPVF would have the 
advantage of complete surprise in its first encounter with U. S. troops. 
  Mao had initially hoped for the CPVF to enter Korea in early September, prior to 
the UNC landing at Inchon and the collapse of the NKPA which followed.  The CMCs August 5 
message to Gao Gang read,  The Frontier Force (NEBDA) . . . should prepare . . . for battle by 
the first 10 days of September.132  As UNC forces did not land at Inchon until September 15, it 
is clear General MacArthurs assault did not determine whether or not China would intervene.  
On August 18, Mao notified Gao Gang that he had extended the CPVF deadline for 
intervention to September 30.133  Then, on October 2, Mao notified Stalin that the new target 
date for Chinese intervention was October 15.134  The first UNC unit, the 3rd ROKA Division, 
crossed the 38th parallel on October 1 and the UNC launched a full offensive on October 8.  On 
this date, Mao officially designated NEBDA as the Chinese Peoples Volunteer Force135 and 
notified Kim Il Sung of Chinas intention to intervene.136  In light of the UNC offensive, this  
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move was probably meant to maintain North Koreas will to fight and prevent the dissolution of 
remaining NKPA elements. 
On October 12, Mao seems to have had second thoughts about when to commit the 
CPVF.  Contrary to Mr. Thorntons arguments, it is doubtful that Maos refusal to intervene 
was in response to the Soviet Unions refusal to supply air cover.  Soviet Foreign Minister 
Molotov had informed Zhou Enlai the previous day that they would be unable to provide air 
cover for at least two and one half months.137 Mao relayed this information to Peng Dehaui on 
the same day and ordered an additional anti-aircraft artillery regiment to Shenyang to join the 
CPVF.138  Mao had already notified Kim that help was on the way and could hardly renege on 
this promise without suffering irreparable damage to Chinas credibility.  While Mao did recall 
Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang to Beijing for consultation,139 it was probably to revise battle plans 
rather than to discuss whether or not Beijing should intervene at all. 
The CPVFs inability to complete necessary preparations prior to September 30 was the 
primary factor that influenced the date of Chinas intervention.  The unexpected sudden collapse 
of the NKPA and the speed of the UNC advance into North Korea were contributing 
supplementary factors.  The lack of Soviet air cover also played an important role in the Chinese 
decision-making process.  None of the supplementary factors had an impact on whether Mao 
would intervene but they did establish the requirement for the CPVF to revise its plans prior to 
entering Korea. 
Mao issued the final orders directing Chinese intervention into the Korean War on 
October 14, 1950.140  The CPVF was to begin movement into Korea on October 19 to establish a  
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defensive line running from Pyongyang to Wonsan.  All CPVF units were to be south of the Yalu 
River and in their assigned defensive positions by October 28.  The immediate Chinese goal was 
to provide a safe haven where North Korea could reconstitute its withdrawing units.  At the same 
time, the establishment of a defensive line would minimize the requirement for the CPVF to 
actively engage in combat with UNC troops and allow it additional time to receive equipment 
and training.  Additionally, the CPVF and NKPA would be able to defend Pyongyang and would 
retain the ability to launch a counterattack towards Wonsan, should the UNC attempt to continue 
its northward advance. 
 The Chinese had no intentions of voluntarily initiating any offensive action until such 
time as they were fully equipped, fully trained and had achieved a clear superiority over the 
enemy.  Mao estimated that it could be as long as six months before the CPVF would be ready to 
take the offensive.  Mao then intended to lure the UNC into an ambush, where the CPVF and 
NKPA could isolate and destroy its scattered units.141  Mao continually emphasized surprise as a 
prerequisite for the Chinese to initiate a decisive first engagement.  Though Maos first priority 
was to eliminate ROKA units, he also recognized that Communist forces might have to engage 
U.S. Army units as well.  In his opinion, the element of surprise would be instrumental in 
counter-acting American firepower superiority.142  
 The CMC quickly realized it had overestimated its logistical abilities.  Only four major 
crossing sites existed over the Yalu River.  260,000 soldiers and their associated equipment 
would have to cross these bridges to enter Korea.  UNC air superiority not only endangered these 
bridges, but also soon proved to be a serious threat to Chinese transportation units.  Chinese 
logistical teams had moved into Korea in advance of the CPVF main units to establish supply 
depots.  Prior to the CPVFs entry into Korea, these same teams had suffered the loss of  
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approximately 200 trucks.143  Hong Xuezhi also reported the loss of another 217 trucks, almost 
17 percent of the total transport available, during the first week of CPVF operations in Korea.  
He further stated that 184 of these trucks were lost as a result of UNC air attacks.144  Such losses 
would soon become a common occurrence for the Chinese. 
 Despite the difficulties involved, CPVF forces entered Korea according to schedule.  By 
October 20, Chinese units were in movement toward their assembly areas where they would 
establish defensive positions and await the arrival of the remaining NKPA elements. By this 
time, the NKPA retained only 2 infantry divisions, 1 tank division, 1 workers division and 1 tank 
regiment.145  What remained was sufficient to allow North Korea to rebuild the NKPA under the 
protective eye of the CPVF. 
Although the CPVF achieved complete surprise when it initially engaged American 
forces, its entry into Korea did not go completely undetected by the United States intelligence 
network.  As early as July 11, 1950, CINCFE had reported, the presence of Communist Chinese 
forces among the North Koreans.146  This was echoed in a July 14 note to the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff.147  Both of these documents also recognized the presence of Chinese troops in North Korea 
as an indicator of the possibility of Chinese intervention.  Despite this, the UNC operations order 
for the advance across the 38th parallel claimed only, some unconfirmed reports of CCF and 
USSR units in North Korean rear areas.  General Headquarters (GHQ) UNC dismissed previous 
reports of Chinese troops in the battle area claiming they were CCF trained and equipped 
North Koreans and, though it acknowledged the movement of Chinese troops into Manchuria, it  
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did not consider Chinese intervention to be a credible threat. 148  In light of the information 
available to the United States, the question arises as to why it was unable to accurately predict 
whether the Chinese would enter the conflict. 
Part of the answer lies in the anti-Communist movement, which was running rampant in 
the United States at the time.  McCarthyism and the CCP victory in the Chinese Civil War had 
led to intense investigations into the careers of personnel who had accurately predicted a 
Communist victory.  As a result, by the outbreak of war in Korea, most of the State Departments 
Far East regional experts had either lost their credibility or were unemployed.  John Hickerson, 
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for UN Affairs (1949-1953) confirmed this fact.  McCarthyism 
. . . led pretty well to the disruption of our own excellent China service contingent in the Foreign 
Service, nearly all those boys had to leave, he stated.149  Distrust of those with Communist 
leanings also led the United States to ignore vital information, which a reliable Beijing source 
forwarded early on October 19, 1950.  The source claimed the Chinese had alerted over 400,000 
border troops for entry into Korea on October 19 or 20.   Washington however, received the 
report with skepticism, as the informant was known to be a Communist sympathizer.150 
 The loss of regional expertise was not limited to the State Department.  The CIA also 
suffered from an inability not only to collect information in the Far East but also to recognize its 
value and to accurately assess its possible impact on United States foreign policy.  Its muddled 
view of China caused it to claim the Chinese would not intervene because they feared the 
consequences of a war with the United States.  It further claimed Beijing was concerned that 
intervention might jeopardize its chances for UN recognition and would encourage anti- 
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Communist forces and endanger the fledgling Communist regime.151  Furthermore, Chinese 
intervention would result in an American declaration of war, which would draw in the USSR and 
could lead to escalation to a general war. 
 The CIA failed to notice that the increase in Chinas anti-American rhetoric made it clear 
that it did not fear the United States and it was not going to back down.  Beijing also had no fear 
of endangering its recognition by the UN.  The United States was already actively parrying 
Communist Chinese political maneuvers to acquire legitimacy through international 
acknowledgement of their government.  Finally, Mao had no fear of an internal revolution. The 
CPVF was but a small portion of the CCF and China retained ample troops to continue 
operations against the scattered Nationalist guerilla elements that remained on the mainland.  
Though the United States did not recognize it, American actions had inadvertently transmitted a 
desire for confrontation to Beijing.  To the Mao, Chinese fears were irrelevant in the face of 
such open American hostility. 
 Another problem was MacArthurs belief that it was the responsibility of the American 
government to determine whether the Chinese or the Soviets would intervene.  To some extent, 
MacArthur was correct, as national level intelligence assets are usually able to produce a clearer 
picture of the overall strategic situation.  However, this did not hold true in the case of American 
operations in the Far East.  Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins estimated in 1950 that 
the United States derived 90 percent of its intelligence on the Far East from Far East Command 
sources.152  As such, it was incumbent on CINCFE (General MacArthur) to focus his intelligence 
assets on assessing the possibility of Chinese intervention.  
 MacArthur later claimed that vital national level intelligence was withheld from him and, 
technically speaking, this could be true. The United States probably derived its intelligence on  
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Chinese troop movements in Manchuria from communications intelligence (COMINT) sources.  
Had this information come from human intelligence (HUMINT) sources, these same sources 
would have been able to report the CPVFs entry into Korea.  General MacArthurs daily 
intelligence summary (DIS) bore a secret classification and would not have contained COMINT, 
which bears a top-secret classification.  But this is where MacArthurs claims lose their validity.  
In his order for the UNC offensive across the 38th parallel, MacArthur identified approximately 
100,000 Chinese troops in Manchuria, which the Chinese could commit to operations in Korea, 
should they so choose.153  MacArthur was, therefore, clearly aware that the Chinese were 
massing in Manchuria.  While his assessment of CPVF strength may have been incorrect, the 
fact remains that it constituted a viable threat to future UNC operations, which he should not 
have dismissed lightly.  It is probably true that CINCFE did not receive raw top-secret COMINT 
information.  It is obvious that he did receive intelligence containing sanitized summaries of this 
information. 
 In an effort to reemphasize the requirement for caution, The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 
dispatched a directive to General MacArthur on September 27, 1950.  This directive outlined 
CINCFEs options in the event of Chinese or Soviet intervention.  It authorized the conduct of 
operations above the 38th parallel so long as there has been no entry into North Korea by major 
Soviet or Chinese Communist Forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter 
our operations militarily in North Korea.  The directive spelled out exactly what MacArthurs 
actions were to be in the event of Soviet intervention.  Yet, in demonstration of the United States 
complete disregard for the capabilities of the CCF, the directive authorized MacArthur to 
continue operations in the face of Chinese intervention as long as action . . . offers a reasonable 
chance of successful resistance.154 
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          Recognizing the increasing possibility of Chinese intervention, the Joint Chiefs attempted 
to clarify their September 27 directive.  In a directive dated October 6, 1950, General MacArthur 
was again authorized to continue operations in the event of open or covert employment 
anywhere in Korea of major Chinese Communist units . . . as long as, in your [MacArthurs] 
judgement, action . . . offers a reasonable chance of success.  The directive made it clear that 
MacArthur was to take no action against China itself without prior national level 
authorization.155  Contrary to their intended purpose of delineating appropriate courses of action, 
these directives ensured that MacArthur would retain his freedom of action when the Chinese 
struck.  
 By mid-October, U.S. officials still failed to take the threat of Chinese intervention 
seriously.  General MacArthur was largely responsible for this outlook.  At his meeting with 
President Truman on Wake Island (October 15, 1950), he stated that CIA and State Department 
sources had detected no intent by the PRC to intervene militarily.  He acknowledged the reported 
the presence of approximately 300,000 Chinese troops in Manchuria, but claimed only 100-
125,000 of these soldiers were located along the Yalu River.  Of these, he claimed that only 50-
60,000 would be able to conduct operations in Korea.  If the Chinese intervened, UNC air strikes 
would render them combat-ineffective before they reached the battlefield.  In his memoirs, 
General Omar Bradley adds that MacArthur claimed that while Chinese intervention was a 
continuing possibility[,]  such action is not probable.156 
 General MacArthur was blinded by his conviction that the Chinese would not intervene at 
this stage of the war and by his faith in aerial intelligence to detect any troop movements into, or 
out of, Korea.  General Willoughby, who was responsible for producing MacArthurs daily 
intelligence summary, shared this view.  Willoughby was further handicapped by his outdated 
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knowledge of China and his personal disdain for the Chinese.157  The Eighth Army was reporting 
the capture of individual Chinese prisoners by October 25,158 but the UNC Command Group 
refused to exercise caution.  The personal beliefs of MacArthur and Willoughby, in conjunction 
with limited intelligence information, established a common disbelief that the Chinese would 
intervene. Niles Bond best stated the resulting shock at Chinas entry into the war:  There  
was . . . tremendous unhappiness when the Chinese attack came across the Yalu, he said simply.  
This was something Willoughby had said wouldnt happen.159 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE CHINESE 1st OFFENSIVE 
 While CPVF units hurriedly crossed the Korean border and moved towards their 
designated assembly areas, UNC troops continued their push northward. UNC forces, in 
demonstration of their belief that the Chinese would not intervene, advanced rapidly with total 
disregard for terrain effects and force dispersion. Augmented by the disintegration of the 
NKPAs remaining elements, UNC actions caused the Chinese to once again re-evaluate their 
plans.  After consulting with Peng Dehuai, Mao ordered a limited offensive, which brought the 
UNC offensive to a temporary halt as the CPVF inflicted punishing losses on its advance 
elements. At this point, UNC GHQ proved unable to confirm Chinese intervention and dismissed 
the offensive as a last gasp attempt by the NKPA to save North Korea.  As a result, when the 
UNC resumed its drive north, the CPVF would again take them by surprise. 
  The four armies of the Chinese 13th Army Group began crossing the Yalu River on 
October 19, 1950.  The 40th Army crossed at Andong-Sinuiju and advanced towards Tokchon in 
central northern Korea.  The 39th Army, after concentrating in the vicinity of Namsidong, 
proceeded towards the cities of Kusong and Taechon, near the western coast of North Korea.  
The 42nd Army crossed near Linjiang and moved to establish defensive positions near Oro-ri, on 
the eastern coast of North Korea.  The 38th Army established an assembly area just inside Korea 
near Kanggye, where it would assume duties as army group reserve.  The 50th Army would also 
remain in reserve at Andong160 
 The Chinese estimated the UNC force to consist of ten to fourteen divisions and one 
brigade, totaling between 100,000 and 120,000 troops.  The CPVF had moved twelve infantry 
and three artillery divisions into Korea.  The remaining four divisions and one brigade of the  
                                                




NKPA were to augment the Chinese and assist in establishing a defensive line along the 
Pyongyang-Wonsan line.  CPVF available strength stood at approximately 200,000 troops.  The 
NKPA would provide another 24,000 to 26,000 troops.  In light of this ratio of forces, General 
Peng felt confident that, while the Communist forces would not be ready for full-scale offensive 
action for some time, they were more than capable of halting the UNC offensive.  However, both 
Peng and Mao had failed to consider the possibility that the UNC would prevent them from 
establishing their defense. 
 General MacArthur was engaged in an all-out effort to subdue the remainder of North 
Korea and was pushing hard to reach the Yalu River.  On October 19, 1950, UNC forces 
captured Pyongyang as the CPVF began entering Korea,.  The next day, ROKA elements 
overran the proposed assembly areas of the Chinese 42nd and 38th Armies in the eastern region of 
North Korea.161  The ROKA 3rd Infantry and Capital Divisions had advanced to the north and 
northeast of Hungnam and were preparing to advance into the mountain ranges to their north.  In 
the west, the ROKA 1st and 8th Infantry Divisions were located north and northeast of Sinanju, 
while the ROKA 6th Infantry Division had almost reached the Yalu itself.  The U.S. 24th Infantry 
Division and the British 27th Commonwealth Brigade followed behind.162 
 The picture of fresh, well-supplied UNC troops racing for the Chinese-Korean border is 
belied by the fact these forces were at the limits of exhaustion.  These units had been on the 
offensive since mid-September without respite and had been unable to fully replace their combat 
losses in men and equipment.  Battle damage to North Korean rail lines, bridges, and port 
facilities imposed severe constraints on the UNCs ability to supply its forward units.  Indeed, 
some units had been unable to advance beyond Pyongyang due to lack of spare parts and 
gasoline.  UNC air forces attempted to alleviate this situation but were only able to deliver  
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approximately 700 tons of supplies per day to forward elements of the Eighth Army.163  Despite 
these serious deficiencies, MacArthur continued to push his forces forward.   
 General MacArthur also demonstrated a complete disregard for the effects of the North 
Korean terrain on UNC combat operations.  As the UNC advanced farther north, the Nangnim 
Mountain Range created a barrier between the Eighth Army in the west and X Corps in the east.  
The road network, which provided the only ground contact between these units, was unfit for 
sustained military traffic.  As early as July 12, 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had identified the 
Korean road network, in general, as seldom motorable and requiring extensive maintenance 
for sustained use.164  Furthermore, A Far Eastern Command area study had acknowledged the 
detrimental effects of this region on combat operations and designated it a barrier area-unsuited 
to large scale military operations.165 
 As UNC troops continued their advance, factors combined to make them increasingly 
vulnerable to isolation and elimination.  UNC units were road bound due to their mechanized 
vehicles and, utilizing the substandard Korean road network, would be unable to provide timely 
mutual support in the event of an enemy attack.  Additionally, should these units attempt to move 
off-road, they would find their supply situation drastically worsened.  Though available supplies 
could be moved forward on the roads, off-road terrain reduced their forward movement to a 
trickle. The high mountains also played havoc with radio traffic, often resulting in the loss of 
communications at critical times.166  These are the conditions under which the Eighth Army and 
X Corps would have to face the CPVF as the Chinese scrambled to halt the UNCs advance on 
the Yalu. 
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 As the Chinese watched the UNCs operations with growing concern, they received more 
disturbing news.  On October 20, Kim Il Sung informed Peng that the NKPA was no longer 
capable of sustained resistance and the burden of defense now lay squarely on the shoulders of 
the CPVF. The final collapse of the NKPA and the failure of the CPVF to establish its defensive 
line forced Peng to consult with Mao as to an advisable course of action.  Based on CPVF and 
UNC force dispositions, Mao decided to conduct a holding action against the U.S. X Corps in the 
east and concentrate his forces against the three advancing ROKA divisions in the West. In 
recognition of the U.S. Armys firepower superiority, Mao directed Peng to stress to his 
subordinate commanders the necessity to avoid being tied down by the American forces.167 
 Maos desire was to inflict a crushing defeat on the UNC in the first engagement.  He was 
aware the United States would not withdraw its forces from Korea unless they suffered a severe 
setback.  Mao was also convinced that the CPVF was more than capable of accomplishing this 
feat, despite General Pengs continual cautionary statements concerning its combat readiness.  
Peng illustrates his realistic appraisal of the state of the CPVF in his October 22 message to Mao.  
In an effort to forestall a full-scale CPVF offensive, Peng stressed that the goal of the proposed 
limited offensive is to extend and consolidate a foothold and to support (NKPA) guerrilla 
warfare in South Korea.168  This is the first intimation that Mao and Peng held conflicting views 
on the capabilities of the CPVF.  This conflict of opinions would play an increasingly important 
role in determining the Communists success in reunifying Korea.  
 The CPVF launched its offensive on October 28, 1950. The Chinese quickly succeeded in 
isolating the ROKA 6th Infantry Divisions 7th Infantry Regiment.  In accordance with Maos 
plan to draw other ROKA elements into an ambush, they then waited for the UNC to react.169   
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They were disappointed, however, when the commander of the ROKA 1st Infantry Division 
recognized the trap and informed General Milburn, the I Corps commander.170  When the UNC 
failed to take the bait the CPVF pressed on with a full assault and by nightfall had succeeded in 
overrunning not only the ROKA 7th Infantry Regiment, but also four other ROKA battalions near 
Onjong.171  By the evening of October 29, the ROKA reported the loss of 2,677 men of the 3,552 
assigned to the 7th Infantry Regiment.  They also reported the ROKA 6th Infantry Division now 
consisted of a single battalion.  The ROKA 8th Infantry Division remained relatively intact, 
having suffered the loss of only two battalions. 
 These events threw the Eighth Army into a state of total confusion.  Though it could 
claim the capture of ten Chinese soldiers, it was unable to determine the level of Chinas 
intervention.  The question remained whether Beijing had committed CCF regular troops.  
Additionally, estimates of Chinese forces ranged from two token regiments, which Eighth Army  
G-2 reported, to I Corps G-2s report of two full-blown divisions of regulars.  At UNC GHQ, 
General Willoughby refused to accept the veracity of I Corps estimate and claimed that ROKA 
had exaggerated the size of enemy forces in an attempt to explain its sub standard performance.  
Willoughby remained convinced that the Chinese had not openly entered the conflict and were 
simply making a token gesture to save face.172 
 Eighth Armys failure to correctly determine the size and disposition of the forces 
opposing it ensured that the Chinese retained battlefield initiative.  The CPVFs continued 
assault and the resulting collapse of the ROKA II Corps left the Eighth Army no choice but to 
withdraw and establish a defensive position just north of Sinanju on the Chongchon River.  In 
what would become an increasingly serious problem for the Chinese, UNC air strikes added 
intolerable strain to the already overloaded Chinese supply lines, leading to massive supply  
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shortages in the assaulting CPVF units. Though the CPVF estimated it had destroyed the 
equivalent of one complete ROKA division,173 it remained unable to break through the UNC 
defensive line.  By November 5, the lines had stabilized and the next day, UNC aerial 
reconnaissance reported Chinese forces withdrawing to the North.174  Although it was not as 
successful as Mao had hoped, the CPVF offensive had succeeded in blunting the UNC advance 
and had bought the CPVF some valuable time to prepare for its next offensive.  
 In X Corps sector, the ROKA 26th Infantry regiment encountered a sizable Chinese force 
north of Chinhung-ni On October 25 and succeeded in capturing two enemy prisoners.  By 
October 28, X Corps had eighteen Chinese prisoners of war in its possession.  These prisoners 
intimated that the Chinese had ordered twenty-four divisions to enter into combat in Korea.  
Though UNC forces had met stiffening resistance, which had stalled their advance north, X 
Corps G-2 dismissed the prisoners claims.  As in the west, contact with the CPVF would 
continue until November 5.  The CPVF could not claim any great successes against X Corps but 
it had fulfilled its mission to delay the UNC advance in the east. 
 In the aftermath of the Chinese 1st Offensive, UNC GHQ stood bewildered.  Chinese 
efforts to disguise the extent of their intervention had successfully confused UNC intelligence 
analysts.  In order to hinder UNC intelligence efforts, China had assigned fictitious unit 
designators to those units active in Korea.  The CPVF had also used decoys, in the form of 
surrendering soldiers, to provide the UNC with conflicting information.175  As a result, both 
Eighth Army and X Corps had been unable to accurately assess the size of the opposing Chinese 
forces.  Additionally, their reports to GHQ UNC had caused confusion due to inconsistencies in 
reporting enemy unit sizes and organization.  For example, X Corps reported that a single 
Regimental Combat Team (approximately Brigade strength) had defeated a full Chinese division  
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and supporting NKPA elements.  Eighth Army meanwhile reported three Chinese divisions and 
supporting NKPA elements had forced four ROKA and two U.S. divisions to retreat.  They 
further claimed that a single Chinese division had mauled the ROKA 1st Infantry Division and 
then forced the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division to withdraw.176 
Based on these reports, and the inability of the UNC to conduct ground or air 
reconnaissance beyond or close to the Yalu River, it was extremely difficult for UNC 
intelligence experts to determine the actual size or intent of the Chinese elements involved.  Did 
these reports accurately indicate the size of the units engaged?  Had the Chinese rotated their 
units into combat in an attempt to appear more numerous than they actually were?  At this point, 
as general Willoughby asserted, it was difficult to deny that the Chinese had chosen to intervene. 
The overriding priority now was to determine in what strength they had entered the conflict and 
what their goals were. 177 
In the end, MacArthur arrived at an estimate of 34,000 Communist Chinese troops in 
Korea. He based this estimate on the fact that his aerial reconnaissance had not detected any 
large-scale movements of Chinese troops across the Yalu.  In light of this small number, he 
advocated immediate resumption of the UNC advance.  U.S. government officials did not agree.  
The Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated the cessation of MacArthurs offensive and the negotiation 
of a cease-fire to preclude further Chinese intervention.  Other politicians desired the President to 
declare end of mission and create a demilitarized zone in North Korea pending the peaceful 
reunification of Korea.  The United Kingdom supported this option.178 
The National Security Council determined the final decision.  They cited three options 
available to the United States.  These options were to halt and assume a defensive stance, to  
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withdraw, or to continue the advance.  The first two options were unacceptable for the same 
reason that the United States had initially committed forces to the defense of South Korea.  
Namely, to back down before a foe that was considered to be highly inferior would cause 
irreparable damage to United States international prestige and would endanger American efforts 
to contain communism in Western Europe.  As such, the United States had no choice but to 
continue its offensive.179 
 MacArthur had an outspoken desire to forcefully reunify Korea.   In his opinion, he had 
proven his judgement at Inchon by authorizing the assault in the face of heated debate.  The 
success of the operation had left the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other governmental officials either 
unable or unwilling to stand publicly against him.  Combined with the recommendation of the 
National Security Council, MacArthurs forceful arguments succeeded in gaining approval for 
the continuation of the UNC advance.  Once again, the UNC began to move northward, having 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE CHINESE 2nd OFFENSIVE 
 Recognizing that the UNC would soon resume its offensive, the Chinese again prepared 
for battle and substantially increased the size of the CPVF.  Chinese leaders developed new 
battle plans and attempted to address the deficiencies noted during their first offensive.  On 
November 25, 1950, the CPVF unleashed a furious assault against the unsuspecting, advancing 
UNC forces.  But while the CPVF inflicted heavy losses on the UNC, it again proved unable to 
effectively isolate and destroy major UNC formations.  The Chinese offensive ended with the 
UNC forced to withdraw down the Korean peninsula but the cost to the CPVF was extreme.  
UNC air power had a devastating impact on the CPVFs ability to maneuver and to effect          
re-supply of its combat formations.  Additionally, UNC superiority in firepower and maneuver 
allowed it, in most instances, to fight off the Chinese attacks and effect an orderly withdrawal.  
The CPVF was able to claim a relative victory upon conclusion of the offensive but its forces 
were left exhausted, under-manned and critically short of necessary supplies. 
 By November 25, the CPVF had swelled to a total of thirty-three divisions.  The 13th 
Army Group now consisted of the 38th, 39th, 40th, 42nd, 50th and 60th Armies, totaling eighteen 
divisions.  The 9th Army Group contained the 20th, 26th and 27th Armies, totaling twelve divisions 
with 150,000 men.  Three artillery divisions rounded out the combat power of the CPVF.  The 9th 
Army Group was concentrated around the Changjin Reservoir in the east, opposite the U.S. X 
Corps.  The 13th Army Group, located in the west, was more spread out.  The 38th and 42nd 
Armies were moving towards Tokchon while the 40th Army advanced towards Yongbyon.  The  
39th Army was in the vicinity of Taechon.  The 60th Army at Kusong and 50th Army on the 
Korean west coast constituted the 13th Army Groups reserve forces.180 
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 Mao and Peng had devised a new plan to lure the UNC forces farther north in order to 
ambush them.  To aid the CPVF in this endeavor, Mao directed the release of one hundred 
prisoners of war (thirty American, seventy Korean).  Peng also directed the Chinese Armies to 
employ small contingents to maintain contact with UNC forces and draw them into ambush 
positions, which the remaining elements of the armies were to occupy and fortify.181 The Chinese 
plan directed the 13th Army to launch a full-scale offensive on the Eighth Armys bridgehead on 
the Chongchon River.  The initial attack was to concentrate against the ROKA II Corps.  As this 
was believed to be the weakest element in the Eighth Army, the Chinese hoped that its collapse 
would enable them to envelop and destroy the Eighth Army in detail.  Meanwhile, the 9th Army 
Group was to attack the 5th and 7th U.S. Marine Regiments using the 20th and 27th Armies.  The 
26th Army was to remain in reserve near the Changjin Reservoir.182 
 The Chinese estimated the UNC forces opposing them in the west to have a strength of 
approximately 130,000 troops.  They estimated X Corps in the east to contain 90,000 troops.183  
Mao claimed that the UNC estimated the total CPVF strength in Korea to be somewhere between 
60,000 and 70,000 soldiers.184  In actuality, the CPVF and NKPA now contained over 380,000 
soldiers.  In light of the UNCs gross underestimation of Communist strength, Mao felt quite 
optimistic in his expectations of inflicting a decisive defeat on the Americans and their allies. 
 CPVF commanders, including General Peng, were not quite so optimistic.  Chinese Army 
commanders had expressed their concern regarding the supply capabilities of their logistical 
services.  They claimed transportation truck losses to UNC aircraft had placed considerable 
restraints on the CPVFs ability to deliver necessary supplies with the result that most units could  
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only claim to have one weeks worth of supplies.185  Various reports confirmed the CPVFs 
severe losses.  The 4th Transportation Regiment had lost seventy-three of its one hundred 
assigned vehicles in a single air raid.  Chinese transportation regiments were not the only units 
affected.  An air raid on the Samdung Rail yard had destroyed eighty rail cars full of equipment 
and supplies.  Hong Xuezhi claimed UNC air strikes destroyed 30-40 percent of Chinese 
supplies while they were enroute to the front.  Nie Rongzhen supported this claim and cited the 
inability of Chinese artillery units to provide sufficient fire support due to a shortage of 
ammunition.186 
 Mao dismissed his commanders concerns as inconsequential and detailed measures to 
overcome the resulting difficulties.187  Yet Mao seems to have been aware of the serious supply 
shortages affecting his forces.  On November 17, Zhou Enlai forwarded a request to the Soviet 
Union for 500 trucks.  The message acknowledged Chinas inability to provide adequate supplies 
of food and winter clothing to the CPVF.  Zhou further acknowledged this problem would have 
an influence on the next stage of the fulfillment of the operation.  Stalin agreed to provide 
almost 1500 automobiles, but would be unable to complete their delivery until December 5.188  
Despite this acknowledgement, CPVF supply difficulties seem to have had no affect on Maos 
plans to resume the offensive. 
 Mao also seems to have underestimated the possible effects of the CPVFs technological 
inferiority on his combat plans.  This was not the case with General Peng.  In a meeting with his 
Army commanders, Peng severely criticized their failure to prevent UNC forces from 
withdrawing.  We routed the enemy more than annihilated them, he stated, and emphasized, in  
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order for their second offensive to be successful, that the CPVF must not allow UNC units to 
escape.  He further stressed the need for rapid movement to envelop the enemy.189 
 Meanwhile, the Eighth Army and X Corps resumed their drive north on November 8, 
1950.  By November 25, U.S. intelligence claimed 48,000 CPVF soldiers (six divisions) and 
48,741 NKPA occupied defensive positions opposite the Eighth Army.  In the X Corps sector, 
intelligence estimates placed the enemy strength at 40,000-70,935 CPVF and 82,799 NKPA 
soldiers.  Opposite X Corps, UNC estimates proved fairly accurate, as Communist forces 
actually consisted of 150,000 soldiers.  In the west, UNC estimates were disastrously low.  In 
actuality, the total number of Communist troops facing the Eighth Army exceeded 240,000 
soldiers.190  As Mao had predicted, this intelligence failure would greatly enhance the element of 
surprise when the CPVF launched its initial attacks.  
 U.S. Intelligence also identified a concentration of Chinese forces in the Nagnim 
Mountains, which threatened to separate the Eighth Army and X Corps.  To counter this threat, 
General MacArthur directed X Corps to reorient their advance and execute a link-up with 
elements on the Eighth Armys eastern flank.191   X Corps was left scrambling to issue new 
directives to its subordinate units.  As X Corps struggled to reorient its drive, U.S. Army 
divisional elements became separated.  The result was the dispersion of the U.S. 7th Infantry 
Division and a concomitant reduction in command and control of subordinate divisional 
elements.  Only the Marines, who had assembled south of the Changjin Reservoir, managed to 
maintain control of their subordinate elements.  This retention of control would prove crucial in 
ensuring the Marines survival during the coming Chinese offensive, just as its absence in the 7th 
Infantry Division would ensure the destruction of the 31st Regimental Combat Team. 
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 The Chinese launched their 2nd offensive on the morning of November 25, 1950.  In the 
west, the Chinese succeeded in overrunning the ROKA II Corps.  The Chinese 38th Army 
virtually destroyed the ROKA 6th Infantry Division and by 1900 hundred hours, reported that 
they had inflicted 5,000 casualties on the ROKA and had occupied Tokchon.  The ROKA 7th 
Infantry Division was forced to withdraw under pressure from the Chinese 42nd Army and with 
the advancing Chinese 38th Army threatening its flank.  Having committed all three of its 
infantry regiments to hold the line, it was left with no reserve to halt the 42nd Army when it broke 
through and was overrun by the Chinese.192   
By the morning of November 26, although the Eighth Army had committed the majority 
of its reserves to combat, it had not realized the dire straits in which it now found itself.  Eighth 
Army HQ maintained the ROKA II Corps was fluid and ordered the IX U.S. Corps to resume 
its offensive.193  At 8:00 AM on November 28, the Chinese 113th Infantry Division occupied 
Samso-ri, well in the rear of Eighth Army, and established blocking positions.  The Chinese also 
established blocking positions farther east on the Kunu-ri-Sunchon road and succeeded in 
ambushing a Turkish unit and the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division, inflicting over 7,300 casualties.194 
Though the CPVF had heeded Pengs demands for speed, it proved unable to hold its 
blocking positions in the face of determined UNC air strikes and ground assaults.  Though it 
succeeded in pinning down the UNC units and inflicting severe casualties, it could not prevent 
their escape.195  On November 29, the UNC began withdrawing to the south and quickly placed 
one hundred miles between its rearguards and the CPVFs advance elements.196  The UNC had 
effectively employed its superior firepower and mobility to ensure the survival of its forces.  As  
 
                                                
192 Zhang, Maos Military Romanticism, pp. 112-113.  See also Roe, The Dragon Strikes, pp. 276-277 
193 Roe, The Dragon Strikes, pp. 280, 283-285. 
194 Zhang, Maos Military Romanticism, pp. 114-115.  See also Roe, The Dragon Strikes, p. 363.   
195 Spurr, Enter the Dragon, p. 220. 
196 Roe, The Dragon Strikes, p. 376. 
69 
the Chinese lacked the means to rectify this situation, the UNC would retain these advantages for 
the rest of the conflict. 
The CPVFs marked inferiority in firepower played an even bigger role in the 9th Army 
Groups offensive in the east.  The 9th army Group succeeded in isolating the two U.S. Marine 
regiments (1st and 7th) and the U.S. Armys 31st Regimental Combat Team (RCT), but was only 
able to eliminate the 2,800 men of 31st RCT.  Here too, Chinese lack of firepower had an effect 
as the CPVF was forced to commit approximately 50,000-55,000 troops in order to achieve 
victory.  The Marines were able to fight their way back to friendly lines, though they also 
suffered heavy casualties.  Upon conclusion of the offensive, the 1st and 7th Marine Regiments 
reported they were at 50 to 60 percent of their original strength. 
 In contrast to the Eighth Army, X Corps quickly grasped the seriousness of the situation 
in which it now found itself and assumed a defensive posture. X Corps stubborn defense, 
combined with intense air strikes on Chinese troops, prevented the CPVF from exploiting its 
advantageous position to conduct a deep envelopment.  After consolidating its forces at Hagaru-
ri, X Corps executed a withdrawal to Hungnam on the coast.  Just as in the west, the Chinese 
were powerless to prevent the UNCs retreat.197 
On December 8, General MacArthur reported Eighth Army successfully completed 
withdrawal south of Pyongyang on 5 December with opposition.  He also passed on the X 
Corps commanders opinion that he can hold the Hungnam bridgehead for a considerable 
period without serious loss and that he can successfully withdraw by sea and air from the 
bridgehead . . . without excessive loss of men or equipment.198 
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General Peng officially ended the Chinese 2nd offensive on December 2, 1950, citing the 
requirement to rest and refit the exhausted soldiers of the CPVF.199  Both the 13th and the 9th 
Army Groups were in desperate need of replacements.  The 9th Army Group had lost 
approximately 45 percent of its original strength and required 60,000 replacements.  The 80th and 
81st Divisions were so badly depleted that they would not see combat again until April 1951.   
When combined with the 45,000 casualties of the 13th Army Group, the total exceeded 30 
percent of the CPVFs strength as it had been at the beginning of the offensive.200  Yet not all of 
these casualties had resulted from contact with the enemy.  Maos refusal to acknowledge the 
CPVFs supply difficulties was also responsible for a large number of Chinese casualties. 
 The CPVF had begun the offensive critically short of food, medicine, ammunition and 
winter clothing.201  These shortages had a direct impact on the CPVFs ability to engage in 
prolonged offensive action, particularly in the east. The Chinese estimate 30,000 of the 60,000 
casualties suffered by the 9th Army Group resulted from frostbite.202  Colonel Wong Lichan, 
CPVF Liaison to the NKPA, reported a large number of what appeared to be snowmen on the 
road from Kanggye to Chinhung-ni.  Upon closer inspection, he discovered these were Chinese 
troops who had frozen to death.203  U.S. Marines also reported finding Chinese soldiers, who had 
frozen in their defensive positions behind their weapons.204  Supply shortages caused Chinese 
soldiers to die not only of exposure, but also of starvation.  Peng himself claims 3,000 soldiers of 
the 60th Army died as a result of the CPVFs inability to re-supply them when they advanced too 
far south.205 
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 The Chinese 2nd offensive also revealed Chinas lack of experience in mobile warfare.  
The CPVFs lack of sufficient mechanized/motorized transport rendered it unable to keep pace 
with UNC units.  The Chinese had believed they could overcome this deficiency if they could 
infiltrate into the enemys rear areas and isolate individual units.  But the UNCs determination 
to save its mechanized units from annihilation surprised the Chinese.  The CPVF, having only 
limited exposure to modern warfare, proved unable to grasp the complexities of mobile tactics.206  
Failure to maneuver effectively, combined with insufficient firepower, resulted in the CPVFs 
inability to prevent the withdrawal of UNC elements. 
 The Chinese again achieved a limited victory with their 2nd offensive.  They drove the 
UNC forces back across the 38th parallel and succeeded in re-capturing most of the territory that 
North Korea had held at the outbreak of hostilities.  The CPVF also reported the elimination of 
36,000 UNC soldiers. It claimed 24,000 of these were American.207  In two months time, the 
CPVF had successfully engaged and defeated (though not eliminated) the Americans superior 
mechanized forces.  Mao attributed Chinas victory to superior strategy and tactics.208 
 What Mao failed to note was that UNC misjudgment and carelessness had given the 
Chinese their victory.  GHQ, UNC had failed twice to accurately assess the size, disposition and 
intent of its adversary and had paid a hefty price for its arrogance.  By the end of the Chinese 2nd 
offensive, it had learned its lesson and would not be taken by surprise again.  On the other hand, 
having tasted victory, Mao, Stalin and Kim were anxious to finish off the UNC and end the 
conflict in Korea.  Despite Pengs continued pleas for additional time to rest and refit his forces,  
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the CPVF would be pushed to the breaking point as it launched one offensive after the other in 
its attempts to drive the UNC from the Korean Peninsula. 
 
CHAPTER 8 
THE STABILIZATION OF THE FRONT LINES   
 The Chinese initiated three more offensives between January and April 1951.  As in the 
previous two offensives, Communist troops proved extremely adept at infiltrating and isolating 
UNC elements but were usually unable to eliminate them due to insufficient firepower.  The 
CPVF also continued to suffer critical supply shortages.  These shortages grew worse with time 
and severely hindered the CPVFs ability to achieve a decisive result.  General Peng Dehuai 
sought to gain the CPVF time to rest and refit but found himself at increasing odds with Mao 
Zedong and Kim Il Sung.  The results of the first two offensives had convinced Mao of the 
superiority of his soldiers and served to reinforce his belief that they could crush the UNC forces 
in spite of their deficiencies. In an effort to effect a decisive end to the conflict, Mao continued to 
push the CPVF to launch one more final offensive.  As a result, by April 1951, an exhausted 
CPVF not only found itself incapable of penetrating the UNC defensive line, but also began to 
experience growing difficulties in containing the UNC counter-offensives. 
 
 Upon conclusion of their 2nd offensive, the Chinese could claim to have restored the 
majority of North Koreas original territory to Kim Il Sung.  Mounting casualties and an inability 
to break the UNCs resolve led Mao to realize that the war would likely develop into an extended 
conflict.  In December 1950, he informed Kim that China was willing to fight for one more year, 
but at that time, the NKPA should be prepared to assume the burden of prosecuting the war. On 
December 7, hoping to forestall a stalemate and acting on recent intelligence information, Mao 
and Kim urged General Peng to continue to prepare a new offensive and resume the attack before 
the UNC could regain its equilibrium.209 
                                                




 Mao was convinced that the X Corps evacuation by sea from the North Korean port of 
Hungnam was a precursor to the United States withdrawal from Korea proper.  Mao was aware 
of the ongoing intense debate over this issue within the American government, which Chinese 
victories in the 1st and 2nd offensives had sparked.  In support of Maos belief that the UNC 
forces were no longer fit to carry on the war, thirteen neutral countries introduced a proposal for 
a Korean cease-fire to the UN General Assembly.  Mao perceived this action as an attempt to 
buy time for the UNC forces to re-establish their defense.  Believing the UNC defense of South 
Korea was crumbling and hoping to hasten its collapse, Mao ordered the CPVF to prepare a new 
offensive.210 
 Both General Peng and his subordinate commanders were well aware of the CPVFs 
current state and urged a delay, claiming at least 2 months would be required to make the CPVF 
combat ready again.211  As the UNC defense now claimed a strength of approximately 260,000 
soldiers, it was apparent that an assault by the CPVF would result in heavy casualties unless it 
received both supplies and replacements.212  Currently only 25 percent of the CPVFs supply 
requirements were being met and it had received no significant numbers of replacements.  Peng 
claimed that, as the CPVF had only 300 operational trucks available to conduct supply 
operations, it had been unable to alleviate shortages of food and winter clothing.  This in turn had 
led to an increase in casualties due to sickness, disease and exposure to the elements.  In 
response, Mao promised Peng 2,000 trucks and 40,000 replacements by the end of February.  In 
the meantime, the assault was to go forward.213 
 The 3rd offensive began on December 31, 1950.  Maos original intent had been to 
eliminate 20,000-30,000 UNC soldiers.  Realizing that this was beyond the current capabilities of  
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the CPVF, Peng appealed to Mao to change the offensives objective.  Mao concurred and 
redefined the objective to be the seizure of Seoul and the establishment of a bridgehead across 
the Han River.  By January 5, 1951, not only had the CPVF captured Seoul, but the 38th and 50th 
Armies had also established defensive positions on the south bank of the Han River. Peng called 
a halt to the offensive on January 8, 1951.  The CPVF was exhausted.  It had suffered additional 
heavy casualties due to shortages of ammunition and exposure to the extreme temperatures of the 
Korean winter.  Chinese casualty estimates were greatly exaggerated.  The CPVF had driven 
UNC forces eighty miles south and claimed to have killed an estimated 19,000 UNC soldiers 
while suffering only 8,500 killed or missing itself.214 
 Peng estimated that the combined forces of the CPVF and NKPA faced approximately 
230,000 UNC troops, who were entrenched and supported heavily by indirect fires and air 
support.215  Peng now claimed three to four months were required for rest and refit.  Mao granted 
him two, with the caveat that the UNC might force them to fight earlier than they desired.216  
Meanwhile, Kim raged at Peng for his refusal to continue his assault against a defeated enemy, 
claiming the Chinese were exaggerating their problems.217  Despite Kims outburst, Peng 
remained firm on his position and began to rebuild his forces.  
 The CPVF did not receive two months to rest.  UNC forces launched a counter offensive 
on January 27, 1951.  Maos response was to order immediate preparation for a 4th offensive, 
despite Pengs urgent claims that the CPVF was incapable of sustained offensive action.218  Mao 
again set the objective as the elimination of 20,000 to 30,000 UNC soldiers.219  Peng became 
more adamant in his request for a delay in launching the offensive.  On January 31, and again on  
                                                
214 Zhang, Maos Military Romanticism, pp. 129-132.   Chinese casualty estimates are unverified.  
215 Xiaobing Li, Maos Generals Remember, p. 18. 
216 Mao to Stalin, 16 January 1951, Weathersby, New Russian Documents on the Korean War, pp. 55-56. 
217 Xiaobing Li, Maos Generals Remember, p. 19.  See also Zhang, Maos Military Romanticism, pp. 133-134. 
218 Zhang, Maos Military Romanticism, pp. 136-137. 
219 Mao to Stalin, 29 January 1951, Weathersby, New Russian Documents on the Korean War, p. 57. 
        
76 
February 7, he communicated to Mao that the CPVF had still not received adequate supplies of 
boots, food, or ammunition.  Maos only response was to authorize Peng to rotate fresh CCF 
units into Korea. 
 The CPVF met with limited success in their 4th offensive and managed to contain the 
UNCs advance, but the end result was a setback for the Communist forces.  In order to halt the 
UNC offensive, Peng adopted a mobile defense, which traded space for time. The front was 
thinly held and gave way to the advancing UNC units until the CPVF could organize a counter-
attack to drive them back and retake the lost territory.  In the face of the UNCs overwhelming 
technological superiority, this measure served to reduce the CPVFs casualties.  The Americans 
and, in particular, their ability to coordinate their infantry and artillery impressed Peng. This was 
a capability that seemed to elude the CPVF.220 
 By late February, the Chinese offensive had again ground to a halt.  Though the Chinese 
had inflicted significant casualties on the UNC,221 they were unable to eliminate any major UNC 
formations.  General Peng made an attempt to justify the CPVFs limited gains.  The enemy 
takes [full] advantage of its excellent equipment, air support and fast transportation, Peng 
stated.222  It was clear to Peng that the Communist and UNC forces were rapidly achieving a 
state of parity.  Nor did Mao remain ignorant of this fact for long.  By March 1, Mao was forced 
to concede to Stalin that the CPVF was no longer capable of prosecuting a general offensive.223  
A frenzied effort to rebuild the Chinese and North Korean forces ensued. 
 By early April 1951, the CPVF had swelled to four major commands with a total of forty-
eight infantry and nine artillery divisions.  Their logistical network now boasted 180,000 
personnel supported by three railroad engineer divisions and nine engineer regiments. Substantial 
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Soviet and Korean air assets in northeastern China were also available to provide air support. 
Facing them was a UNC force of approximately 240,000 soldiers who could rely on an 
additional 120,000 soldiers for reinforcement.224   
 The Chinese now realized they were susceptible to the threat of a UNC amphibious 
assault into their rear area.  Not wishing to be caught in the same trap as the North Koreans had 
been, Mao and Peng began to plan a 5th offensive.  Peng was aware of the CPVFs continuing 
supply difficulties but was committed to this offensive based on its preemptive nature. Hong 
Xuezhi claimed that, in spite of the expanded size of the CPVFs logistical support network, it 
was still only capable of supplying 225 of the 550 tons of equipment and ammunition, which the 
CPVF required daily.  Based on the current situation, the Chinese had three options. The CPVF 
could attack, withdraw, or remain in place and be isolated when UNC forces landed behind.   
Mao and Peng felt the circumstances left them no other alternative than to attack.225 
 The Chinese 5th offensive commenced at 6:00 A.M. on May 10, 1951.  The Chinese made 
limited gains until May 20, when they began to run critically short of ammunition.  As casualties 
mounted and CPVF gains diminished, Peng called a halt to the offensive and ordered a general 
withdrawal.  The Chinese retreat became a disaster when the UNC launched a counter-attack on 
May 23.  Peng established a defensive line by May 27, but the effort cost the CPVF 85,000 
casualties.  The Chinese 3rd Army Group alone suffered 13,000 casualties.226  At this point, both 
the Peoples Republic of China and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea had no choice 
but to acknowledge the war had become a stalemate and to enter into negotiations for a cease-
fire.227 
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 Throughout these offensive operations in Korea, the Chinese were plagued by UNC air 
power.  UNC air strikes proved extremely effective at inflicting casualties on the CPVF.  On 
December 30, 1950, a UNC air raid reduced two regiments of the Chinese 1st Artillery Division 
to twenty-four guns when it caught them in movement. 228  During the 3rd offensive, Hong 
Xuezhi also reported to Zhou Enlai that the CPVF had, suffered extremely heavy losses to 
enemy air raids. 
UNC air strikes also succeeded in crippling the CPVFs logistical support of its combat 
formations.  During the 4th offensive, the UNC had reduced the CPVFs material re-supply by 
60-70 percent.  By April 1951, the CPVF supply lines, which had achieved a length of 300-400 
kilometers, suffered continual disruption and CPVF engineers were unable to keep the Yalu 
River bridges operational due to UNC air strikes.  UNC air raids also caused CPVF supply units 
to lose contact with the combat formations and further delayed the delivery of much-needed 
supplies.  Though the Chinese expanded their air forces in response, they were unable to project 
this air power to the forward battle areas.  The same UNC air strikes, which impeded the re-
supply of CPVF combat formations, rendered the Chinese incapable of supplying fuel and 
ammunition to forward air bases in quantities sufficient to support forward basing of their fighter 
aircraft.  As a result, they were forced to remain in the rear, where they could not provide 
effective air cover.229 
Reduced supply had a concomitant effect on combat operations.  Not only did CPVF 
units find it impossible to sustain their offensive operations without rations, but they also 
suffered grievous casualties due to exposure to the elements.  The effects of the CPVFs inability 
to provide adequate winter clothing reached critical proportions during the 3rd offensive. Cold 
weather injuries rendered the entire Chinese 586th Infantry Regiment (196th Infantry Division) 
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combat ineffective.  The 116th Infantry Division suffered over 2,000 casualties to exposure.  
Many other regiments and battalions also reported they were combat ineffective and some 
divisions reported that the extreme cold had reduced them to 50 percent strength.230  The 
resulting losses to exposure, and the Chinese failure to provide replacements in a timely manner, 
greatly extended the time required for the reconstitution of CPVF combat formations.  This 
proved to have an increasingly detrimental impact on Chinese operations as the war dragged on. 
 Lack of sufficient ammunition further exacerbated the CPVFs inferiority in firepower 
and directly affected the outcome of its offensives by greatly reducing its abilities to annihilate 
enemy formations.  Though the Chinese proved highly adept at infiltrating and isolating UNC 
units, they were rarely able to eliminate them.231  This deficiency manifests itself again and again 
throughout the Chinese 3rd, 4th and 5th offensives. 
 During the 3rd offensive, the Chinese 39th Army isolated the ROKA 1st Infantry Division 
but was unable to either eliminate it or prevent its withdrawal.  The Chinese 39th and 40th Armies 
experienced the same result in their confrontation with the ROKA 6th Infantry Division.  The 
CPVF did achieve some successes, though these would be the last victories of this type for some 
time to come. The British 29th Brigade suffered the loss of thirty-one tanks as a result of their 
encounter with the Chinese 149th Infantry Division. The Chinese 42nd and 66th Armies succeeded 
in eliminating the 31st and 32nd ROKA Regiments (ROKA 2nd Infantry Division), as well as a 
regiment of the ROKA 5th Infantry Division.  They also captured over sixty ROKA artillery 
pieces.  
          The 4th and 5th offensives saw no CPVF elimination of any major UNC combat 
formations.  Though the CPVF captured 7,800 UNC soldiers, it allowed the U.S. 2nd Infantry 
Division, as well as the ROKA 3rd and 5th Infantry Divisions to escape.  The battle for Chipyong- 
                                                
230 Xiaobing Li, Maos Generals Remember, p. 131. 
231 Ibid., p. 23. 
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ni is the most prominent example of the CPVFs failure to pin and destroy UNC units.  The 23rd 
U.S. Infantry Regiment, with the support of a battalion of French infantry, an artillery battalion 
and twenty tanks, successfully resisted all CPVF attempts to reduce its positions.  Finally, during 
the 5th offensive, the combined forces of the 20th CPVF Army and the NKPA 5th Corps isolated 
the ROKA 5th and 7th Infantry Divisions but failed to eliminate them prior to their escape.232 
 These deficiencies were the direct result of Maos exaggeration of CPVF and NKPA 
abilities.  Likewise, he grossly under estimated the abilities of the UNC.  Though Peng and his 
subordinate commanders quickly developed a healthy respect for the UNC forces opposing them, 
Mao refused to acknowledge the CPVFs difficulties and continued to urge them on.  The result 
was an ever-increasing reduction in the combat capabilities of the CPVF at a time when China 
needed these qualities most.  The UNCs expanding forces and capabilities now forced China to 
the negotiating table.   
 
                                                
232 Zhang, Maos Military Romanticism, p. 130, 141, 151. 
 
SUMMARY 
The nations involved in the Korean War signed an armistice on July 27, 1953.   By this 
time, the war had become a political contest as the opposing armies jockeyed for position in an 
attempt to obtain concessions from their opponent at the negotiating table. It is clear that 
misperception on the part of Kim, Mao and Stalin, and miscommunication on the part of the 
United States, resulted in these nations committing their forces to war.  However, Communist 
expectations of a short war failed to bear fruit and both China and North Korea found themselves 
embroiled in conflict for three long years. 
The Chinese could claim victory in that they had fought the United States to a standstill 
and demonstrated to the world that they were a force not to be taken lightly.  The CCF had 
gained a vast amount of experience in the conduct of modern warfare as well.  Approximately 73 
percent of Chinas infantry forces, 67 percent of the artillery forces and 100 percent of the 
armored forces participated in the conflict at one time or another.  According to Chinese 
statistics, over three million Chinese volunteers eventually took part in the Korean War.233 
 The cost of Chinas victory was not cheap.  The war resulted in a lengthy delay in 
Chinas economic reconstruction program.  Indeed, they would not succeed in repaying their 
war-incurred debts to the Soviet Union until 1965.234  The conflict resulted in over one million 
Chinese casualties, including 154,000 dead or missing.235  The Chinese claim to have lost almost 
400 aircraft and 13,000 vehicles.  Additionally, Chinese troops would remain in North Korea 
until 1958.236 
                                                
233 Xiaobing Li, Maos Generals Remember, pp. 5-6. 
234 Goncharov, Uncertain Partners, p. 201. 
235 The UNC suffered over 500,000 casualties, including more than 94,000 dead.  See Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent  
      and Fighting Front Chapter XXIII at http://www.army.mil/CMH-PG/books/korea/truce/ch23.htm.  U.S.  
      casualties totaled 109,958, including 27,704 dead and 4,442 missing in action (SOURCE: Pocket Data Book,  
      1962, Army Comptroller located at http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/documents/237ADM.htm. 




           China failed not only in its dream of permanently removing the imperialist presence 
from the Korean Peninsula and eliminating the threat to its industrial basin but also ensured the 
permanent postponement of their offensive designs against Taiwan.  On October 1, 1953, the 
Republic of Korea and the United States signed a Mutual Defense Treaty, in which the ROK 
authorized the U. S. the right to dispose . . . land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of 
the Republic of Korea.237  A mutual defense agreement between the United States and the 
Republic of China (Nationalist China) followed on December 2, 1954.  This document 
effectively precluded any overt Chinese aggression against Taiwan by granting the United States 
the right to dispose such . . . land, air and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores as 
may be required for their defense.238 
Though China could claim victory of a sort, Maos errors ensured that he would never 
realize his dream of a unified China.  Marshal Nie Rongzhen best summed up the reasons for 
Chinas failure to achieve its goals in intervening in the Korean War.  We entered the war in 
haste and were not well prepared.  Moreover, we had little combat experience with the American 
army outside China, he stated239 
 
                                                
237 Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea, October 1, 1953, document located   
      at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/kor001.htm. 
238 Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China, December 2, 1954, document  
      located at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/chin001.htm. 
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